Institute for the Study of War

Iran Update, July 21, 2025

by: ISW Press

 

 

 
 
 
 
 

Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Schmida, Avery Borens, Nidal Morrison, and Andie Parry

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry announced on July 21 that senior Iranian officials will meet with E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) officials in Istanbul, Turkey, on July 25 to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue.[1] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi will attend the talks. The talks come as the E3 has threatened to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran. The E3 has warned that it may trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not resume nuclear negotiations with the United States and make “concrete results” in the negotiations by the end of August.[2] The E3 would have to initiate the snapback mechanism by September 3 to complete the snapback process before the mechanism expires in October 2025.[3] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei emphasized on July 21 that the Iran-E3 talks are separate from nuclear negotiations with the United States and stated that Iran has “no plans” to negotiate with the United States.[4]

Baghaei also announced that Iranian officials will meet with Chinese and Russian officials on July 22 to discuss the possibility of the E3 triggering the JCPOA snapback mechanism.[5] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia and China would likely not be able to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[6] Any JCPOA signatory can initiate the snapback process by referring Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution.[7] China and Russia could therefore try to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran by proposing a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but the United States, the United Kingdom, or France could veto such a resolution.

Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow on July 21, possibly to try to secure Russian military assistance following the Israel-Iran War. Iranian media reported that Nasir Zadeh and Belousov discussed “expanding military cooperation.”[8] Iranian media also reported that Nasir Zadeh attended Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 20.[9] Nasir Zadeh heads the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, which oversees the Iranian defense-industrial complex and manages Iranian arms sales and purchases.[10] Iran has long sought to acquire Russian Su-35 fighter jets and has pressured Russia to provide it with S-400 air defense systems after Israeli airstrikes in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[11] Russia has not provided Iran with this equipment and is unlikely to do so in the near future, which underscores the limits of the Russo-Iranian strategic relationship.[12] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may expand strategic relations with other partners, such as China, due to Russia’s limited support for Iran during and after the war.[13]

Pro-government Bedouin groups and Druze militias continued to adhere to the US-brokered ceasefire in Suwayda Province on July 21 as Syrian transitional government forces evacuated over 1,500 Bedouin civilians who were targeted in intercommunal violence since July 13.[14] Druze militias have obstructed the implementation of some ceasefire terms, but fighting has not resumed on a large scale.[15] Suwayda Internal Security Commander Brigadier General Ahmed al Dalati announced on July 21 that Druze militias agreed to allow Suwaydawi civilians to evacuate the province with assistance from the Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) until “their safe return to their homes is secured.”[16] Dalati also announced that the transitional government established a security cordon around Suwayda Province to stop fighting between Druze and Bedouin militias and maintain the ceasefire agreement.[17] The evacuation of civilians from Suwayda is part of the second phase of the July 18 ceasefire agreement, which also mandates the delivery of humanitarian aid and the provision of basic services to civilians in Suwayda Province.[18] Druze militias prevented the delivery of humanitarian aid by the transitional government into Suwayda Province on July 20, however.[19] The Syrian Communications Ministry also said that Druze militias prevented it from entering Suwayda City to assess the city’s fuel needs and address electricity and communications outages.[20] The Syrian Foreign Ministry condemned Druze militias on July 20 for preventing Syrian Red Crescent aid convoys led by three Syrian ministers from entering Suwayda.[21] The Syrian Foreign Ministry said that Druze militias only permitted a small number of Red Crescent vehicles to enter the province.[22] Druze militias reportedly did not participate in a prisoner exchange on July 20 in the town of Umm al Zaytoun, which was stipulated in the second phase of the ceasefire agreement.[23]

The transitional government faces major obstacles in restoring the rule of law, regaining trust, and healing inter- and intra-communal divisions in Suwayda Province even as the ceasefire holds. The third phase of the ceasefire mandates that internal security personnel will deploy to Suwayda Province and that state institutions in the province will reopen.[24] This phase will be difficult for the government to effectively implement due to the displacement of 93,000 people from Suwayda Province since fighting began, the ongoing documentation of atrocities by all actors, and Bedouin-Druze and intra-Druze conflict.[25] Distrust between the Bedouin and Druze communities remains high as more accounts of reciprocal atrocities surface.

This inter-communal mistrust is compounded by the Druze community’s distrust of the transitional government after government forces committed abuses against Druze civilians upon deploying to Suwayda Province on July 16.[26] This distrust challenges the government’s ability to maintain order and restore the rule of law in Suwayda. The Syrian government remains responsible for holding all perpetrators of atrocities accountable, including government forces. The Syrian National Inquiry Commission, which investigated the massacres of Alawites on the Syrian coast in March, presented its findings to President Ahmed al Shara on July 13.[27] While the details of the Inquiry Commission’s conclusions have yet to be published, whether or how the transitional government holds its forces accountable for abuses committed during the March coastal violence will likely inform future peace processes in Suwayda Province. The Syrian government’s response to the coastal atrocity report could further build or degrade minority trust in Suwayda, depending on how the government responds to the report’s findings. Holding perpetrators of atrocities accountable requires the government to not only investigate the atrocities, but to act on its findings and charge, sentence, and punish perpetrators.

Key Takeaways:

Iran

Senior Iranian officials reiterated their opposition to the planned Zangezor Corridor to senior Armenian officials on July 19. The Zangezor Corridor is a Turkish-Azerbaijani proposed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan proper to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Iran opposes the proposed Zangezor Corridor because the route would cut off Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian emphasized that Iran opposes any “change in the region’s geopolitics” in a phone call with Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan.[28] Grigoryan assured Ahmadian that Armenia has not changed its position “regarding regional transit routes.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately emphasized Iran’s support for “preserving the territorial integrity of all countries” in a phone call with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.[29] The July 19 phone calls come after the United States offered on July 11 to manage the Zangezor Corridor.[30] Iranian media described the Zangezor Corridor on July 16 as a Turkish attempt to extend Turkish influence into Eurasia.[31] Iranian media also argued that the Zangezor Corridor would prevent Iran from being able to militarily support Armenia against Azerbaijan. Iran has become increasingly concerned about the growth of Turkish influence in the South Caucasus in recent years, particularly since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Iranian officials have expressed concern that Russia’s focus on the war in Ukraine has left a power vacuum in the South Caucasus for other regional actors, such as Turkey and Israel, to exploit.[32]

The Iranian Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) navies started an annual naval exercise with the Russian Navy in the Caspian Sea on July 21.[33] The exercise is taking place in the 4th Artesh Naval District, which is based in Bandar Anzali, Gilan Province, and will continue until July 23.[34] A Russian naval commander told Iranian media on July 21 that the exercise demonstrates Iran and Russia’s commitment to “strengthening military interactions” with each other.[35] Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan participated in the previous iteration of this exercise in July 2024.[36]

Iran is continuing to develop its space program, which could support Iran’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Iran conducted a suborbital test of the Qased space launch vehicle (SLV) on July 21 to evaluate unspecified “new technologies.”[37] The Qased SLV previously launched the Nour-1 satellite in April 2020, the Nour-2 satellite in March 2022, and the Nour-3 satellite in September 2023.[38] All three launches took place at the Shahroud Space Center in Semnan Province, which is operated by the IRGC Aerospace Force.[39] Advancing Iran’s space program could contribute to Iran's development of ICBMs, given that SLVs use similar technologies.[40] The Defense Intelligence Agency previously assessed in 2019 that Iran was developing SLVs with “increasing lift capacity” and “boosters that could be capable of ICBM ranges and potentially reach the continental United States, if configured for that purpose.”[41]

Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Ali Reza Sabahifard met with newly appointed IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Majid Mousavi on July 21.[42] Sabahifard claimed that Iranian air defense capabilities forced Israel to “retreat” during the Israel-Iran War. Israeli strikes on Iranian air defense systems during the war enabled Israel to establish air superiority over large parts of Iran, however. Sabahifard’s meeting with Mousavi follows a series of similar meetings between senior Iranian military commanders in recent days. Many of these commanders were recently appointed to their posts by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei following the Israeli decapitation campaign targeting senior Iranian military commanders during the Israel-Iran War. The recent meetings include a meeting between newly appointed Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Majid Mousavi on July 14 and a meeting between newly appointed IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pak Pour and newly appointed Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami on July 17.[43]

The Guardian Council reappointed Ahmad Jannati and Siamak Rahpeyk as its secretary and deputy secretary, respectively, on July 18.[44] The Guardian Council is a 12-member regime body that is responsible for supervising elections, vetting candidates, and approving legislation. Jannati has served as the Guardian Council secretary since 1988.[45] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reappointed senior clerics Ahmad Khatami, Alireza Arafi, and Ahmad Hosseini Khorasani as Guardian Council clerical members on July 15.[46] The Iranian Parliament approved Hadi Tahan Nazif, Gholam Reza Mola Beygi, and Behzad Pour Seyyed as Guardian Council legal experts on July 16.[47]

Iraq

An Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee delegation met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and National Wisdom Movement leader Ammar al Hakim in Baghdad on July 20.[48] Iraqi media reported on July 20 that Hakim has been mediating efforts between the Shia Coordination Framework and Shia nationalist cleric Moqtada al Sadr to convince Sadr to re-enter Iraqi politics.[49] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Sadr announced in March 2025 that his political party would not participate in the upcoming November 2025 parliamentary elections, although some Iraqi politicians speculate that Sadr could sway voters by endorsing certain policies or candidates.[50]

Syria

US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi met on July 19 to discuss steps to restore Syrian stability and unify Syria.[51] Barrack stated after the meeting that there could be a breakthrough in negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government “in the coming weeks.“[52] A Turkish journalist that previously wrote for a pro-Erdogan newspaper claimed on July 21 that the United States and Turkey gave the SDF a 30-day deadline to finish integrating into the Syrian government.[53] The Turkish journalist claimed that Turkish and US officials told the SDF that some SDF units would not integrate into the Syrian army and would need to disarm.[54] The SDF denied this report.[55] CTP-ISW cannot verify this report.

Barrack also stated that he believes that the violence in Suwayda Province will not derail integration negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government.[56] Syrian media have accused Syrian Defense Ministry forces of raiding homes, conducting summary executions, looting, and threatening civilians at gunpoint.[57] These actions risk eroding Syrian minority communities’ trust of the Syrian government, regardless of whether or how the government holds perpetrators accountable. Minority communities that fear the government will not protect them, such as the Kurds, may view the violence in Suwayda as confirmation of their fears and resist integration and disarmament. Kurdish political parties have consistently cited government protection of Kurdish citizens and their rights as one of their most important demands of the government.[58]

Arabian Peninsula

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted drone strikes on Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Port on July 21.[59] The IAF said that it destroyed Houthi infrastructure, including fuel tanks, vessels, and engineering tools used to restore the port.[60] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on July 21, minutes after the strikes, shows smoke plumes near berths two and five. The IAF recently struck and caused significant damage to berth two on July 6.[61] Satellite imagery indicates that the Houthis minimally repaired damage that the port’s berths sustained during the most recent Israeli strikes on July 6. Israeli airstrikes targeting Hudaydah Port since May 2025 have rendered several berths at the port inoperable.[62] The recent Israeli strikes could further hinder the Houthis’ ability to repair these facilities.

The IAF intercepted a Houthi drone before it crossed into Israeli territory on July 21 after Israel struck Hudaydah Port.[63]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

[1] https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1947110751929237571

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-hold-nuclear-talks-with-european-powers-friday-2025-07-20/

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025

[4] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/30/3358890

[5] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/30/3358890

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-3-2025

[7] https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf ;

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/snapback-sanctions-iran-more-bark-bite

[8] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/234585/Iran-Russia-defense-ministers-meet-in-Moscow

[9] https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1947209086866530591

[10] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf?x85095

[11] https://x.com/ali_motahari_ir/status/1939591211867582569 ; https://www.newsweek.com/iran-pivots-russia-china-quest-new-weapons-after-israel-war-2100933 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-9-2025

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025

[14] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1947200677068865898

[15] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1159 ;https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1947011605784318184

[16] https://t.me/sana_gov/134075

[17] https://t.me/syriafree25/1512

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-19-2025 ; https://t.me/sana_gov/133962 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1946614190103286064

[19] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1159 ;https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1947011605784318184

[20] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1947011605784318184

[21] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1159

[22] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1159?single

[23] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1946969578031947831

[24] https://t.me/sana_gov/133963

[25] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1947200677068865898 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1947261700366868659 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1947351857644335587 ; https://x.com/andynovy/status/1945930804728561723 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1946313538462433418

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025

[27] https://t.me/SyPresidency/1270

[28] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/763609/

[29] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/875879/

[30] https://www.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-centers/strengthening-us-turkiye-relations-and-advancing-relations-with-syria ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-has-told-armenia-it-is-ready-manage-transport-corridor-with-azerbaijan-2025-07-16/

 

[31] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/762702

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-14-2023

[33] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/764227

[34] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf

[35] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/30/3359205

[36] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/501292/Iran-hosts-joint-Caspian-Sea-search-and-rescue-exercise

[37] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/30/3359195

[38] https://nextspaceflight dot com/rockets/231 ; https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-05/news-briefs/iran-launches-military-satellite ; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/09/29/iran-launches-satellite-using-ballistic-missile-technology/

[39] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-strikes-iran-shahroud-space-center.html ; https://mepei dot com/iran-launches-its-first-military-satellite-into-orbit/

[40] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-21-2023

[41] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf

[42] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/764209

[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2025

[44] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/515797/Key-figures-retain-positions-in-Iran-s-Guardian-Council-presidium

[45] https://iranwire.com/en/politics/118680-97-year-old-cleric-jannati-re-elected-as-guardian-council-chief/

[46] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/message-content?id=60686

[47] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/25/3355606

[48] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/وفد-يراني-في-بغداد-لمراجعة-العلاقات-الثنا-ية-مع-العراق ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/30/3359007/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A6%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AC%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%AD%DA%A9%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D9%82%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B4%DA%A9-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86 ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6537564/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%B3%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%B1-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AF

[49] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/ال-طار-يبحث-عن-مفتاح-الحنانة-ويستعين-بشخصية-دينية-ل-قناع-الصدر

[50] https://x.com/salih_m_iraqi/status/1905319183518150830 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7 ; https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/270320252

[51] https://x.com/USEmbassySyria/status/1946655485773692960

[52] https://apnews.com/article/syria-us-barrack-israel-druze-ede9f5299c4e59a477736842adcd7de9

[53] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrian-kurds-face-30-day-ultimatum-us-turkey

[54] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrian-kurds-face-30-day-ultimatum-us-turkey

[55] https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1947356843308614063

[56] https://apnews.com/article/syria-us-barrack-israel-druze-ede9f5299c4e59a477736842adcd7de9

[57] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025

[58] www.npasyria dot com/211587

[59] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1947208668241375573

[60] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1947208668241375573

[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-10-2025

[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-10-2025

[63] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1947268927374938582

Attachments:

  • Iran%20Update%2C%20July%2021%2C%202025%20PDF.pdf

    • Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 21, 2025

    by: ISW Press

     

     

     

     

    Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, and George Barros with Nate Trotter

    July 21, 2025, 5:30 pm ET 

    Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

    Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

    Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

    Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

    Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on July 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

    Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 20 to 21 that included over 400 drones as Russia continues to launch significantly larger strike packages in June and July 2025 than in January to May 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 426 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched five Kh-46 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Tambov Oblast; four Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; one Iskander-K cruise missile from Millerovo; and 14 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down and suppressed 200 Shahed-type drones and 203 decoy drones that Ukrainian air defense fire and electronic warfare (EW) downed all the missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 23 strike drones hit three locations and that drone debris fell in 12 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian and critical infrastructure in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, and Kharkiv oblasts.[2] Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko reported that the Russian strike damaged the entrance to a metro station in the city.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian strikes injured 15 civilians and killed two.[4] Russia rarely launched over 200 drones per night between January and May 2025, and an overnight strike package consisting of over 400 drones — even if far below Russia's latest record high of 728 drones in one strike package — demonstrates the dramatic shift in Russia's ability to repeatedly launch larger-scale drone strikes in recent weeks since May 2025.

    Ukraine's Western partners pledged additional military and financial assistance to Ukraine during a virtual meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on July 21. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that Germany will transfer five Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine in the near future and that Germany will also send 200,000 Gepard shells to Ukraine.[5] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius also confirmed that Germany will send five Patriot air defense systems and necessary interceptors to Ukraine.[6] Shmyhal stated that Canada will contribute an unspecified amount toward financing Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) via the "Danish model" (in which Ukraine's partners buy Ukrainian-manufactured weapons for the Ukrainian military) and allocated 20 million CAD ($14.6 million) to Ukrainian tank maintenance. Shmyhal stated that the Netherlands allocated 200 million euros (roughly $234 million) to fund Ukrainian production of interceptor drones to counter Russian Shahed-type drones and 125 million euros (roughly $146 million) for F-16 fighter jet maintenance. Shmyhal stated that Norway also allocated one billion euros (roughly $1.67 billion) to fund Ukrainian drone purchases in 2025, including 400 million euros (roughly $468 million) specifically to purchase drones from Ukraine's DIB.

    British Defense Secretary John Healey announced during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting on July 21 a "50-day drive" to arm Ukraine on the battlefield and help push Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table.[7] Healey noted that the group needs to seize on US President Donald Trump's threat to impose "severe" 100 percent secondary tariffs on Russia's trade partners if there is no peace settlement to end Russia's war in Ukraine within 50 days from July 14.[8] ISW has consistently assessed that only significant Russian battlefield setbacks, enabled by timely and sufficient Western military assistance to Ukrainian forces, will force Putin to reconsider Russia's ability to militarily defeat Ukraine and bring him to the negotiating table.[9] Such setbacks will not happen in a matter of weeks and will likely require several months or campaign seasons, assuming that the West commits to properly equipping and aiding Ukrainian forces to the point that Ukraine could successfully conduct such operations.

    Ukrainian officials discussed Ukraine's increasing defense industrial capacity amid ongoing European aid announcements. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) can accommodate an additional $6 billion in investments and that Ukraine could use these funds to produce more first-person view (FPV) and interceptor drones and long-range weapons.[10] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine intends to increase domestic defense production over the next six months.[11] Ukrainian Defense Procurement Agency Head Arzen Zhumadilov told Ukrainian television channel Kanal 24 that Ukraine has contracted with three companies, including one Ukrainian and one American company, to produce interceptor drones to counter Russian Shahed-type drones.[12] Zhumadilov stated that Ukraine's DIB currently has the capacity to produce eight to 10 million FPV drones per year but that the Ukrainian government will only be able to fund the procurement of four to 4.5 million drones in 2025 due to budgetary constraints.

    Ukraine officially proposed a third round of negotiations with Russia amid speculation in the Ukrainian and Russian informational spaces. Russian officials continue to feign interest in good-faith negotiations, despite failing to propose or agree to a third round of negotiations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 21 that Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov recently proposed conducting a third round of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul, Turkey.[13] A source told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on July 21 that Ukrainian and Russian delegations could meet in Istanbul as early as July 22 or 23.[14] Unspecified sources cited by Kremlin newswire TASS confirmed that Ukraine proposed a third round of negotiations to Russia and stated that negotiations may be held on July 24 or 25.[15] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 21 that Russia is in favor of conducting a third round of negotiations with Ukraine, that the Kremlin would announce when a date had been set, and that Russia’s delegation to the third round of negotiations would be the same delegation that attended previous Istanbul negotiations in May and June 2025.[16] Russia and Ukraine last met in Istanbul on June 2 and only concluded agreements about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges due to Russia’s refusal to provide Ukrainian negotiators with a memorandum of its terms for a peace settlement in advance of negotiations.[17] The Kremlin has since repeatedly claimed interest in a third round of negotiations as Russian officials have reiterated in June and July 2025 Russia's long-standing demands that amount to Ukrainian capitulation.[18] Russia’s decision to send the same, mid-level negotiating team to the reported upcoming third round of negotiations indicates that Russia’s disinterest in peace negotiations is unchanged. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains dedicated to protracting peace negotiations to support continued offensive operations in Ukraine and extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West.[19]

    Key Takeaways

    We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

    Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

    Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 20 and 21.[20]

    A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions near Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[21]

    Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

    Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

    Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces seized Andriivka, Kindrativka, and Oleksiivka (all north of Sumy City) in the past two weeks (since about July 7).[22]

    Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 20 and 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Kindrativka and southwest of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces only maintain positions in a limited number of houses in Kindrativka.[24]

    Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces advanced to Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka) in the past two weeks and that Russian forces recently advanced 150 to 200 meters near Yablunivka and Oleksiivka and toward Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[25] Mashovets reported that Russian forces have advanced about 0.8 to one kilometer from the international border along both banks of the Volfa River near Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City near the international border).[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[27]

    Russian forces conducted offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne, Yunakivka, and Sadky, on July 20 and 21.[28] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the Kostyantynivka-Volodymyrivka-Novomykolaivka-Oleksiivka area (north of Sumy City).[29]

    A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not seized the entirety of Ryzhivka (southwest of Bezsalivka).[30]

    Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, reinforced by elements of the 51st and 137th VDV regiments (both of the 106th VDV Division), are operating in the Sumy direction.[31] Mashovets stated that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) and an understrength battalion of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD) are operating in the Andriivka-Kindrativka-Oleksiivka area. Mashovets reported that the Russian military command introduced elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) into battle about a week and a half ago (about July 10) in the Andriivka-Kindrativka-Oleksiivka area as part of efforts to stabilize the situation. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command replenished the forward elements of the 11th and 83rd separate VDV brigades near Novomykolaivka and Yablunivka and recently reinforced the brigades with elements of the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are operating near Bezsalivka.[32] Elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kindrativka and Andriivka, and elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Pysarivka and Khotin (both north of Sumy City).[33] Elements of the 119th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Beszalivka.[34] Elements of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC) are reportedly operating near Ryzhivka.[35] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[36]

    Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

    Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 21 but did not advance.

    Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Starytsya on July 20 and 21.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[38]

    The chief of staff of a Ukrainian drone battalion stated that Russian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast are conducting motorized and infantry assaults and sometimes try to use heavy equipment.[39] The chief of staff stated that Russian forces are moving in smaller groups consisting of two people. An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported that Russian forces are attacking in small groups on motorcycles and buggies.[40]

    Order of Battle: The chief of staff of a Ukrainian drone battalion stated that elements of the Russian 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[41] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) are operating in Vovchansk and in the Vovchanski Khutory direction.[42]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 21 but did not advance.

    A Russian milblogger claimed on July 21 that Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove.[44]

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction.[45]

    Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 21 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself, northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Stroivka, and north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka, Holubivka, Radkivka, and Kindrashivka on July 20 and 21.[46]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 21 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zelenyi Hai on July 20 and 21.[47]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) recently advanced 1.5 kilometers toward Torske (east of Lyman) as part of efforts to reinforce elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, CMD) that are currently partially isolated in Torske.[48]

    Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove, Serednie, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 20 and 21.[49]

    Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating near Nove (north of Lyman).[50]

    Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Vekhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).[51]

    Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on July 20 and 21.[52]

    Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 6th, 123rd, and 127th motorized rifle brigades (all part of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Hryhorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, and Vyimka.[53] Artillery elements of the 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Pereizne (south of Siversk).[54]

    Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

    Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) participated in the seizure of Bila Hora.[56]

    Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) and elements of two unspecified regiments advanced up to one kilometer along the railway toward Oleksandro-Shultyne (just west of Bila Hora).[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and southwest of Bila Hora.[58]

    Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Predtechyne on July 20 and 21.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shultyne.[60]

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Chasiv Yar.[61]

    Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

    Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 20 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced east of Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[62]

    Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 242nd and 255th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) recently advanced 250 to 300 meters in the Popiv Yar-Poltavka and Novoolenivka-Rusyn Yar directions (all northwest of Toretsk).[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further east of Rusyn Yar, southwest of Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk), and southeast of Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk).[64]

    Russian forces attacked in Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka and toward Katerynivka and Pleshchiivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Romanivka on July 20 and 21.[65]

    The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Russian forces often attack without adequate food and water supplies.[66]

    Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) with the recent claimed seizure of Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[67] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 20th and 150 motorized rifle divisions are unsuccessfully attacking near Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove.[68] Drone operators of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) and 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Popiv Yar.[69] Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Dachne (north of Toretsk), and elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[70] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[71]

    Russian forces recently advanced south of Pokrovsk amid reports that the Russian military command is reinforcing its force grouping northeast of Pokrovsk.

    Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zvirove and seized the remainder of Pishchane (both south of Pokrovsk).[72] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 30th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) recently advanced near Pishchane and Zvirove.[73]

    Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) recently advanced to the western outskirts of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and interdicted the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezheva highway.[74]

    Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Mayak, Volodymyrivka, Novotoretske, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zvirove and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne on July 20 and 21.[75]

    Mashovets stated on July 21 that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the Russian 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, SMD) to reinforce the Russian force grouping attacking north and northeast of Pokrovsk.[76] ISW last observed reports of the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade operating near Toretsk in January 2025, and the brigade has likely been resting and reconstituting over the last six months.[77] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade have reportedly been operating in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka direction over the last two months.[78] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command intends to leverage these units to intensify efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and that elements of the 2nd CAA have simultaneously intensified assaults south of Pokrovsk. ISW has recently observed a series of Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk aimed at both enveloping Pokrovsk and creating the base of a salient to attack Ukraine's fortress belt from the south.[79] The redeployment of elements of two brigades to the area indicates that the Russian military may be preparing to intensify assaults against Pokrovsk in the near future.

    Order of Battle: The Russian MoD claimed that drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian positions near Balahan (immediately east of Myrnohrad).[80]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that elements of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) recently advanced 1.5 kilometers toward Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[81] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) and unspecified Russian Spetsnaz forces are advancing north of Voskresenka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[82] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Piddubne (southwest of Novopavlivka).[83]

    Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Zaporizhzhia and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Yalta, Zirka, Piddubne, Myrne, Tovste, and Zelenyi Hai and toward Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka on July 20 and 21.[84]

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoselivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[85]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 21 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Maliivka and toward Komyshuvakha and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole, Temyrivka, and Novopil on July 20 and 21.[86]

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Berezove (west of Velyka Novosilka).[87]

    Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 21 but did not advance.

    Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 21.[88]

    Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Poltavka (east of Hulyaipole).[89]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 21 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and west of Orikhiv near Plavni on July 21.[90] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to counterattack near Kamyanske.[91]

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Plavni and Orikhiv; elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv); elements of the 108th and 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske; and elements of the Nemets group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[92]

    Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including on the islands in the Dnipro River, on July 20 and 21, but did not advance.[93]

    Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly striking targets on the right (west) bank Kherson Oblast, and elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[94]

    Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

    See topline text for reports of Russian strikes against Ukraine.

    Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

    Nothing significant to report.

    Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

    [1] https://t.me/kpszsu/38974

    [2] https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=773252865205784&rdid=FJ2p9JGauwX5UGv8 ; https://suspilne dot media/ivano-frankivsk/1071377-unaslidok-kombinovanoi-ataki-rf-v-ivano-frankivskij-gromadi-e-travmovani/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15893; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1503; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1498 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1497 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1071381-odna-ludina-zaginula-sered-postrazdalih-e-ditina-naslidki-rosijskoi-ataki-kieva/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/46380 ; https://armyinform.comdot ua/2025/07/21/udar-po-shesty-rajonah-kyyeva-zagynula-lyudyna-gorily-bagatopoverhivka-dytsadok-i-rynok/

    [3] https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1506; https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2025/07/21/see-the-aftermath-of-a-russian-strike-that-hit-kyiv-homes-and-a-metro-station-shelter

    [4] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1947193015874805776

    [5] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/10886 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/21/denys-shmygal-rozpoviv-na-yaku-dopomogu-ukrayina-mozhe-rozrahovuvaty-pislya-ramshtajnu/

    [6] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/nimechchina-dopomozhe-iz-patriot-pistorius-1753097906.html

    [7] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2025/07/21/7522743/

    [8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425 ; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2025/07/21/7522743/ ; https://www.gov dot uk/government/news/uk-ramps-up-ukraine-military-support-with-150-million-of-vital-air-defence-and-artillery-ammunition-delivered-in-just-two-months

    [9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121924

    [10] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/10885 ; https://suspilne dot media/1072035-ukraini-potribno-6-mlrd-abi-zakriti-progalinu-u-virobnictvi-ozbroen-smigal/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/21/amerykanska-zbroya-ta-finansuvannya-glava-mou-rozpoviv-pro-shho-jshlosya-na-zasidanni-ramshtajnu/

    [11] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15204 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15205 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15206 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-predstaviv-novogo-ochilnika-ministerstva-99089

    [12] https://24tv dot ua/droni-perehoplyuvachi-shahediv-skilki-droniv-mozhe-vigotovlyati_n2871357 ; https://suspilne dot media/1072067-ukraina-zakontraktuvala-droni-perehopluvaci-u-kilkoh-virobnikiv-sered-akih-e-ukrainskij/

    [13] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1947287078699503693; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/finansuvannya-opk-vikoristannya-rosijskih-aktiviv-chlenstvo-99097; https://suspilne dot media/1072131-zelenskij-rozpoviv-detali-pro-majbutni-peregovori-z-rf-u-stambuli/

    [14] https://suspilne dot media/1071649-ukraina-ta-rosia-mozut-provesti-novij-raund-peregovoriv-u-stambuli-vze-cogo-tizna-dzerelo/

    [15] https://tass dot ru/politika/24570549

    [16] https://tass dot ru/politika/24567875; https://t.me/tass_agency/326399; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525;

    [17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225

    [18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025

    [19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625

    [20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26873 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WN5NzNxa89NX8cz3SykRZk8wgwCqtAYqfPyVeBGHSCUaMvbDE7X2DbBFaYh1xQ8Al

    [21] https://t.me/rusich_army/24789

    [22] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2877;

    [23] https://t.me/Waryaz_we_are/253; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1947196511164764429; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9625; https://t.me/skala425/625; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1946954017856168029

    [24] https://t.me/severnnyi/4610

    [25] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2877

    [26] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2877

    [27] https://t.me/wargonzo/27972

    [28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26873 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WN5NzNxa89NX8cz3SykRZk8wgwCqtAYqfPyVeBGHSCUaMvbDE7X2DbBFaYh1xQ8Al; https://t.me/wargonzo/27972; https://t.me/severnnyi/4610

    [29] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2877

    [30] https://t.me/rusich_army/24789;

    [31] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2877

    [32] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2877

    [33] https://t.me/dva_majors/75728; https://t.me/dva_majors/75733

    [34] https://t.me/severnnyi/4618

    [35] https://t.me/severnnyi/4618

    [36] https://t.me/mod_russia/54855; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/31501

    [37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WN5NzNxa89NX8cz3SykRZk8wgwCqtAYqfPyVeBGHSCUaMvbDE7X2DbBFaYh1xQ8Al; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14170; https://t.me/wargonzo/27972

    [38] https://t.me/severnnyi/4610

    [39] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/21/nastup-dvoh-kolon-zakinchyvsya-na-yihnij-terytoriyi-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-zrozumily-nedoczilnist-vykorystannya-broni/

    [40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/20/na-broni-ne-doyihaty-drony-j-artyleriya-zmusyly-okupantiv-peresidaty-na-moto-ataky/

    [41] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/21/nastup-dvoh-kolon-zakinchyvsya-na-yihnij-terytoriyi-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-zrozumily-nedoczilnist-vykorystannya-broni/

    [42] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2878

    [43] https://t.me/dva_majors/75738

    [44] https://t.me/severnnyi/4610

    [45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96215

    [46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26873; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WN5NzNxa89NX8cz3SykRZk8wgwCqtAYqfPyVeBGHSCUaMvbDE7X2DbBFaYh1xQ8Al; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14170; https://t.me/wargonzo/27972; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13649

    [47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26873; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WN5NzNxa89NX8cz3SykRZk8wgwCqtAYqfPyVeBGHSCUaMvbDE7X2DbBFaYh1xQ8Al; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14170

    [48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2878; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/14GMaKfmT5h/

    [49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26873; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WN5NzNxa89NX8cz3SykRZk8wgwCqtAYqfPyVeBGHSCUaMvbDE7X2DbBFaYh1xQ8Al; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14170; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2878

    [50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2878; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/14GMaKfmT5h/

    [51] https://t.me/dva_majors/75738

    [52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26873; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WN5NzNxa89NX8cz3SykRZk8wgwCqtAYqfPyVeBGHSCUaMvbDE7X2DbBFaYh1xQ8Al

    [53] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2878 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/14GMaKfmT5h/

    [54] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1947209353909747717; https://t.me/shock3OA/1532

    [55] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9629; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/31492

    [56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39137; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39141

    [57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2879; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/14GMaKfmT5h/

    [58] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66052 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39141

    [59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26873; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WN5NzNxa89NX8cz3SykRZk8wgwCqtAYqfPyVeBGHSCUaMvbDE7X2DbBFaYh1xQ8Al; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14170; https://t.me/wargonzo/27972

    [60] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66051

    [61] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1947318796018180183; https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/1778

    [62] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9626; https://t.me/b4_101/178 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1947001932242919525

    [63] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2879

    [64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173195 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66052 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39122

    [65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26873 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WN5NzNxa89NX8cz3SykRZk8wgwCqtAYqfPyVeBGHSCUaMvbDE7X2DbBFaYh1xQ8Al ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14170 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75738 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66052 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31520

    [66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/21/yak-dushyty-targaniv-palczyamy-poblyzu-toreczka-pozycziyi-syl-oborony-shturmuyut-golodni-ta-poraneni-rosiyany/

    [67] https://t.me/mod_russia/54859 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2025

    [68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2879

    [69] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14065 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14060

    [70] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14063 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14063

    [71] https://t.me/dva_majors/75767

    [72] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1947276953259512042 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39154

    [73] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2879

    [74] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2879

    [75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26873 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WN5NzNxa89NX8cz3SykRZk8wgwCqtAYqfPyVeBGHSCUaMvbDE7X2DbBFaYh1xQ8Al ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14170 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75738

    [76] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2879

    [77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2025

    [78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2025

    [79] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525

    [80] https://t.me/tass_agency/326467

    [81] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2879

    [82] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39140 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96212

    [83] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96212

    [84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26873 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WN5NzNxa89NX8cz3SykRZk8wgwCqtAYqfPyVeBGHSCUaMvbDE7X2DbBFaYh1xQ8Al ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14170 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96212 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75738

    [85] https://t.me/voin_dv/16087

    [86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26873; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WN5NzNxa89NX8cz3SykRZk8wgwCqtAYqfPyVeBGHSCUaMvbDE7X2DbBFaYh1xQ8Al; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14170

    [87] https://t.me/voin_dv/16079

    [88] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0XQ9EQKLpQWNwYK6vD74CeEskF7XiC4i3qG2QtyziPshZ26JK6Hjni4HiJwhtsDiZl

    [89] https://t.me/voin_dv/16098

    [90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26873; https://t.me/dva_majors/75738

    [91] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31540

    [92] https://t.me/dva_majors/75734; https://t.me/dva_majors/75728; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173221; https://t.me/dva_majors/75751; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31527      

    [93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26873; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zs5b5yNGLA3CqdePMCUpvMEQqd4Av6t3WZ52cffsxxfgkpEwVQJbdba3Q8tdJZUZl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0XQ9EQKLpQWNwYK6vD74CeEskF7XiC4i3qG2QtyziPshZ26JK6Hjni4HiJwhtsDiZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WN5NzNxa89NX8cz3SykRZk8wgwCqtAYqfPyVeBGHSCUaMvbDE7X2DbBFaYh1xQ8Al; https://t.me/dva_majors/75738

    [94] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/8582; https://t.me/dva_majors/75764; https://t.me/dva_majors/75772

    Attachments:

  • Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20July%2021%2C%202025%20PDF.pdf

    • Russian Occupation Update, July 21, 2025

    by: ISW Press





    Authors: Paul Conroy, Eloise Herdegen, Zachary Yacht, Andrew Raynus, and Karolina Hird

    Data cut off: 9 am ET, July 21

    ISW's Russian Occupation Update tracks the activities that occur in the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. This product line replaces the section of the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment covering activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.
     
    To read ISW’s assessment of how Russian activities in occupied areas of Ukraine are part of a coerced Russification and ethnic cleansing campaign, click here. 

    Key Takeaways:

    Russia is creating and propagating a water crisis in occupied Ukraine. Acting chairman of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) government Andrei Chertkov stated on July 19 that there is a “critical situation with water supply” in occupied Donetsk Oblast and that residents of various occupied settlements will begin receiving water supply only once every two to three days.[1] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Adviser Petro Andryushchenko reported on July 17 that large areas of Russian-occupied Ukraine, including Mariupol’s Tsentralnyi Raion and settlements and cities such as Chystiakove, Donetsk Oblast, and Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, currently lack running water.[2] Russian occupation authorities frequently ration water across the occupied territories, turning on running water once every six days in occupied Chystiakove and Torez and once every three to four days in occupied Yenakiieve, Donetsk Oblast.[3] Residents of occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, also experience water shortages due to frequent power outages that disrupt pumping stations, and are likely to experience them more frequently than residents of occupied Donetsk Oblast due to falling Dnipro River water levels.[4]

    Both Russian and Ukrainian media have widely reported on water shortages across Russian-occupied territories. Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, citing Head of the DNR Ministry of Coal and Energy Denis Epifanov, reported July 17 that critical water shortages could lead to the shutdown of the Zuivska Thermal Power Plant in occupied Zuhres, which provides a third of all power in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[5] Komsomolskaya Pravda also reported on July 18 that pro-Russian “activists” in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast are distributing drinking water in coordination with occupation authorities—emphasizing the fact that water must be delivered by hand due to service shortages.[6] Ukrainian outlet NewsUA reported on July 14 that according to the occupation administration-run water authority “Vody Donbasa” (“Waters of Donbas”), the occupied cities of Torez, Donetsk City, Makiivka, Yasynuvata, Horlivka, Yenakiieve, Debaltseve, Kirovske, Zhdanivka, Shakhtarsk, and Snizhne are all experiencing acute water shortages.[7]

    The water crisis in occupied Ukraine is a direct result of Russia’s occupation of Ukraine and the resulting destruction and mismanagement of water resources. Andryushchenko reported that Russian forces destroyed the water main connecting the Donets River to the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal, which delivered drinking water in occupied Donetsk Oblast until the beginning of the full-scale invasion, and Ukrainian combat units have recently posted footage of Russian forces using dry water pipes as shelters, confirming the fact that water is not running through the canal as it should.[8] This also suggests that Russian forces are using water infrastructure for military purposes. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant on June 6, 2023, severely limited water supplies from the North Crimea Canal to occupied Crimea, highlighting how Russian military activities have put water supplies in occupied areas at risk.[9] Russian occupation authorities frequently blame Ukraine for “cutting off access” to water in order to shift blame away from Russia, but the fact remains that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has significantly damaged the water infrastructure that existed in these territories prior to 2022.[10]

    Russian occupation officials are clearly aware of the water crisis in the occupied territories and have promised to solve the issue, but have been ineffective in managing water shortages.[11] Andryushchenko reported that occupation authorities have raised the price of water in the occupied territories from 3 rubles ($0.03) to 5 rubles ($0.06) per liter to compensate for shortages.[12] Ukrainian publication Vchasno reported on July 14 that Russian occupation administration officials have begun exploring the use of mining effluent (liquid waste materials created as a byproduct of mining operations) as a source of drinking water to solve the water crisis.[13] Water from mines is polluted with heavy metals, radionuclides, and industrial waste, which makes it unsafe to drink and can cause an increased risk of cancer. Komsomolskaya Pravda reporter Dmitry Steshin claimed that Russian occupation officials are providing residents of occupied areas with imported bottled drinking water that contains dysentery pathogens.[14] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Crimea service Krym Realii reported on July 15 that Russian law enforcement arrested and fined a woman in occupied Simferopol for organizing a local protest against the water shortages and advocating for the restoration of safe drinking water.[15] Russia has also used bots on local Telegram channels to attempt to influence the information space and spread propaganda minimizing water issues, further suggesting that occupation administrations are aware of the gravity of the issue but are more concerned with managing public sentiment in the information space in order to create the impression that Russia is properly managing the occupation of Ukraine.[16] OpenMinds and DFRLab reported on July 16 that Russia is using fake comments on social media in the occupied territories and has posted over 9.5 thousand fake comments regarding the water crisis.[17]

    Russia’s mismanagement of the water crisis in occupied Ukraine may amount to a violation of international law. The 4th Geneva Convention requires Russia, as a belligerent occupying power, to provide for the health and hygiene of the population it is occupying, which includes providing basic needs such as clean and safe drinking water. Rather than meeting this obligation, DNR head Denis Pushilin claimed that in order to begin restoring destroyed water infrastructure, Russia needs to capture Slovyansk, using the ongoing humanitarian crisis to justify further violence against Ukraine.[18]

    Russia continues efforts to consolidate the military-patriotic indoctrination of Ukrainian children under the Russian Volunteer Society for the Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF). DOSAAF is a Soviet-era youth movement that promoted military skills, and which Russia has resuscitated since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[19] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on July 17 that DOSAAF has been training “patriots and specialists” for over a century, and that occupation authorities will transfer water sports clubs, aeronautics facilities, and technical creativity facilities in occupied Kherson Oblast to Russian DOSAAF control.[20] Saldo also reported that his administration is working to transfer facilities associated with the Society for Assistance to the Defense of Ukraine (OSO, the DOSAAF equivalent based in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) to Russian DOSAAF control. The transfer of old DOSAAF and OSO facilities to the control of the contemporary iteration of DOSAAF will allow DOSAAF greater oversight into the Russification of Ukrainian children and youth. Russia lowered the age for admission into DOSAAF from 18 to 14 in 2024, meaning that the organization can now target even younger children in occupied territories.[21] DOSAAF also further creates a conscript recruitment pipeline to ensure that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) maintains enough manpower for long-term goals, as ISW has previously reported, and will allow the Russian MoD to look to youth in occupied Ukraine as a potential recruitment pool.[22] ISW assesses that Russia will continue to use DOSAAF to streamline the militarization of youth in occupied Ukraine in tandem with the existing ecosystem of youth-focused military-patriotic organizations such as the Movement of the First and Yunarmia.

    Crimean occupation officials are taking additional steps to consolidate control over the information space in occupied Crimea in order to more easily levy “high treason” charges against residents for perceived pro-Ukrainian behavior. Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov announced on July 18th that the Crimea occupation administration introduced a ban on the distribution of media, photos, and videos, which includes information about locations of Russian air defense systems, weapons, troop positions, and the consequences of Ukrainian drone or missile strikes on military targets in Crimea.[23] This ban is likely to give Russian law enforcement greater access to people’s personal devices and social media posts and will allow Russia to further crack down against perceived pro-Ukrainian or anti-Russian activity in occupied areas. Russia is already pursuing several efforts to encourage self-censorship via information space repression and intense internet monitoring. ISW previously assessed that the Russian occupation authorities would increase surveillance efforts in occupied Ukraine to prevent resistance to the occupation and more easily accuse Ukrainian civilians of “high treason” for allegedly supporting the Ukrainian military.[24] Occupation authorities have previously used artificial intelligence to analyze data collected from video surveillance of occupied Crimea. This new ban will likely worsen the human rights situation in occupied Crimea and lead to increased arrests, detentions, and long “high treason” sentences against residents.

     

    [1] https://t.me/astrapress/86968

    [2] https://t.me/andriyshTime/40468

    [3] https://t.me/andriyshTime/40468 ; https://fedpress dot ru/news/80/society/3390290

    [4] https://t.me/andriyshTime/40468

    [5] https://www.donetsk dot kp.ru/daily/27726/5115820/

    [6] https://www.zap dot kp.ru/online/news/6477927/

    [7] https://newsua dot one/news-military/114661.html

    [8] https://t.me/andriyshTime/40514; https://t.me/andriyshTime/40470 

    [9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-june-12-2025

    [10] https://www.donetsk dot kp.ru/daily/27726/5115820/ 

    [11] https://t.me/AndreyChertkov/696

    [12] https://t.me/andriyshTime/40468 

    [13] https://vchasnoua dot com/news/mriiut-pro-cistu-vodu-z-krana-v-okupovanomu-donecku-liudiam-xocut-perekriti-deficit-vodi-saxtnimi-stokami

    [14] https://t.me/DmitriySteshin/13811

    [15] https://ua.krymr dot com/a/krym-voda-aktsiya-protestu-peresledivannya/33474029.html

    [16] https://t.me/berdyansk_occ/13165

    [17] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/report-russian-bot-networks-occupied-ukraine/

    [18] https://t.me/PushilinDenis/6812

    [19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2024

    [20] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/8519 

    [21] https://sprotyv.org dot ua/en/in-the-tot-of-ukraine-joining-the-dosaaf-military-organization-will-be-compulsory-from-the-age-of-14/

    [22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2025

    [23] https://t.me/Aksenov82/7802 

    [24] https://isw.pub/OccupationUpdate042125

    Attachments:

  • Russian%20Occupation%20Update%2C%20July%2021%2C%202025%20PDF.pdf

    • China-Taiwan Weekly Update, July 21, 2025

    by: ISW Press





    Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Brysen Winthrop of the Institute for the Study of War;

    Alexis Turek and Alex Chou of the American Enterprise Institute

    Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute

    Data Cutoff: July 16, 2025

    The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

    Taiwan continued its yearly Han Kuang military exercises through July 18, introducing new exercises and systems reflective of President William Lai Ching-te’s effort to improve Taiwanese defensive capabilities and resilience against PRC aggression. The offshore Taiwanese islands of Penghu, Matsu, and Kinmen all hosted drills, reflecting the key role that these islands would play in a cross-strait conflict. Taiwanese infantry and armor participated in an amphibious landing drill on Penghu on July 15.[1] A PLA capture of Penghu would likely allow the PLA to use it as a staging ground for further offensive operations against the Taiwanese mainland.[2] Exercises on Matsu simulated a PRC attack beginning with harassment by drones and fishing boats and escalating into a PLA attempt to seize the island.[3] Taiwanese forces drilling in Kinmen deployed over 30 armored vehicles and fired over 30,000 rounds.[4] A July 15 drill featured a simulated amphibious attack on Kinmen Bridge, a sea bridge connecting Kinmen’s main island to Lesser Kinmen.[5] Drills on Taiwan’s main island focused on sites deemed at-risk in the event of a PRC attack. Taiwanese forces simulated a PRC incursion around the Tamsui River in New Taipei on July 12.[6] The Tamsui River connects the Taiwan Strait to Taipei and has been an area of concern for Taiwanese officials following the apprehension of PRC nationals illegally transiting into the Tamsui. [7]

    The 2025 Han Kuang exercises highlight the Lai administration’s increasing emphasis on the importance of societal resilience and urban infrastructure in a cross-strait conflict. Taiwanese officials incorporated existing infrastructure and systems into the drills.[8] Taiwanese forces practiced using Taipei’s Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) metro system to transport Javelin missiles and food across the capital on July 14.[9] Taiwan held sweeping air-raid and evacuation drills encompassing numerous major cities between July 15-18.[10] Taiwan has also taken steps to inoculate its citizens against potential disinformation campaigns, a critical element of PRC coercion. Taiwanese defense officials warned against misinformation about the drills and said that they believed the PRC would be watching Han Kuang closely.[11]

    US-made systems played a key role in the Han Kuang exercises. Taiwan deployed US-made Stingers, Patriots, and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) during drills, the latter for the first time. Drills involving Stingers focused on low-altitude defense during an amphibious landing scenario.[12] Taiwan also deployed US-made Abrams tanks at the Hsinchu military base.[13] Taiwan is expected to receive a second batch of HIMARS in 2026.[14] Taiwan also simulated escorting US supply ships into the Port of Hualien, although US ships did not participate in this exercise. The Taipei Times cited anonymous officials who said that the United States could feasibly resupply Hualien “with minimal risk” in a wartime scenario.[15]

    PRC Defense Ministry spokesperson Jiang Bin criticized US arms sales to Taiwan in a July 14 press conference and accused Taiwan of making “war provocations.”[16] Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua delivered similar criticisms of the Han Kuang exercises on July 9 and accused Taiwanese authorities of “separatism” and efforts to “incite cross-strait confrontation.”[17] The PRC will likely maintain such framing as a means of criticizing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) officials and denigrating Taiwan’s self-defense efforts.

    At least four China Coast Guard (CCG) ships operated in the restricted waters of Taiwan's Pratas Island during the Han Kuang exercises, mirroring tactics used around Kinmen. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that it intercepted two CCG ships that separately entered Pratas’ restricted waters on July 9 and 11. One ship, CCG 3101, turned off its Automatic Identification System (AIS) in waters west of Pratas between July 7-11, according to data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence. The ship was likely going “dark” to conduct its patrol around Pratas. The other ship, CCG 5303, sailed in a straight line through Pratas’ restricted waters on July 10 without stopping.[18] Starboard data showed that a third ship called CCG 607 may have approached Pratas Island on July 11 and turned its AIS off until July 16, but the CGA did not mention it in its reports. The CGA reported that two more ships, CCG 3103 and 3105, jointly patrolled within Pratas’ restricted waters the night of July 16 with their AIS turned off.[19] The CGA did not rule out that the CCG was trying to consume Taiwan’s law enforcement energy during the Han Kuang exercises. The unusually high number of CCG ships around Pratas in one week supports this explanation.

    The CCG’s “dark” patrols around Pratas appear to be a new trend in line with normalized CCG incursions around Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen Islands since 2024. The recent Pratas patrols coincided with CCG patrols into Kinmen’s restricted waters on July 10 and 11.[20] Turning off AIS is likely meant to impede Taiwan’s ability to monitor and respond to CCG incursions and avoid international attention on the PRC’s coercive activities. The CCG previously conducted six consecutive patrols that fully circled Pratas with AIS turned on between May 28 and July 2, as well as earlier incursions that followed different patterns.[21]

    The CCG’s experimentation with different tactics and gradual normalization of patrols around Pratas closely resembles the progression of the “Kinmen model” in 2024. The “Kinmen model” is a concept introduced in PRC state media in May 2024 that refers to normalizing CCG “law enforcement” patrols around Taiwan’s outlying islands, starting with Kinmen, to assert PRC legal jurisdiction there and erode Taiwan’s control of those waters. [22] The model would ostensibly be justified in the name of protecting PRC fishermen, but could set conditions for a future quarantine or seizure of the islands from Taiwan.

    PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi attended the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Foreign Ministers Meetings, taking advantage of favorable geopolitical conditions to further the PRC’s regional agenda. The China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting took place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from July 10 to 11.[23] Wang met with his counterparts from Southeast Asia, the United States, and Russia, among others. Wang’s statements following these meetings included rhetoric about the importance of increased trade and cooperation within international organizations, reflecting the PRC’s desire for increased influence over ASEAN states and at least tacit alignment on geopolitical issues.[24] Statements from ASEAN foreign ministers lacked references to points of contention, such as the South China Sea, which have been evident in previous high-level engagements between the PRC and ASEAN.[25] ASEAN rhetoric and the stated interest in economic engagement with the PRC are likely driven by US tariffs and a perceived lack of US interest in Southeast Asia. ASEAN states have increasingly looked to the United States and other countries as an alternative to the PRC amid growing PRC influence in the region. The PRC has characterized the United States’ economic and foreign policy decisions under the Trump administration as “destabilizing” to the global economy.[26] ASEAN states may be less likely to challenge PRC aggression and coercion now than in previous years due to fear of further worsening their economic situation. ASEAN states may currently view the PRC as a more reliable economic partner than the United States, which could result in closer PRC-ASEAN alignment.

    Key Takeaways  

    Cross-Strait Relations

    Taiwan

    The passage of a Kuomintang (KMT)-backed special budget may bolster the party’s popularity ahead of recall votes against KMT legislators. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) passed a KMT-backed special budget on July 11.[27] The bill adds approximately 18.5 billion US dollars to the budget, including 5.1 billion dollars for “national security resilience.”[28]

    The DPP-controlled Executive Yuan created the original version of the special budget, which the KMT amended and passed on April 24.[29] The KMT originally opposed the appropriation of funds for national security but ultimately incorporated the measures from the DPP’s version.[30]  The Ministry of National Defense announced on July 3 that it would direct the funds toward leasing new satellites, building drones, and integrating radar systems into a universal imaging platform.[31] The ministry stated that these funds would also support Taiwan’s ability to respond to threats.[32]

    The KMT’s passage of the supplemental budget, including defense spending, may increase the likelihood that its legislators will survive the upcoming mass recall elections. Taiwan will hold recall elections against 31 KMT lawmakers on July 26 and August 23.[33] The recall movement has argued that the KMT is impeding Taiwan’s ability to resist CCP coercion, and some recall organizers openly accused the KMT of being a CCP “puppet.”[34] Recent polling data suggests that the perception that the KMT is “pro-CCP” is one of its vulnerabilities, and the same perception has driven a group of traditionally pro-KMT military veterans to campaign in favor of the recalls on July 15.[35] KMT Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia reaffirmed the KMT’s continued support for a cross-strait policy based on the concept of “One China” and the 1992 Consensus on July 10, however.[36] 

    China

    The New York Times reported that the PRC has been conducting extensive seabed mapping near Taiwan and Guam since 2023, which could enable submarine operations and undersea countermeasures in a future conflict. This report aligns with previous Coalition Defense of Taiwan (CDOT)-ISW analysis concerning the potential for PRC seabed mapping to facilitate submarine navigation. PRC research ships significantly expanded their bathymetric survey operations off Taiwan's east coast in 2024. At least six PRC research ships conducted systematic seabed mapping operations using precise grid and parallel line patterns throughout 2024. This marked a substantial increase from the one PRC research ship observed in the area in 2023. These ships mapped the waters off Taiwan's coast and approached Taiwan's 12-nautical-mile territorial boundary but did not cross into territorial waters.[37] The Xiang Yang Hong 05, Xiang Yang Hong 06, and other PRC research ships also conducted extensive surveys in 2024 and 2025 immediately east and west of the US Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. One such survey has been ongoing east of Guam since June 2025. Transponder data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence confirmed the ships’ paths. Guam hosts a US air base and naval base that would very likely play a key role in defending Taiwan from a PRC invasion.

    The PRC’s bathymetric surveys around Taiwan and Guam may facilitate submarine operations and naval warfare.[38] Some PRC research ships are equipped with advanced sonar equipment, deep-sea sampling technology, and unmanned submarines.[39] PRC universities have published reports on the viability of Pacific Ocean features, such as the Kuroshio current, for submarine tactics.[40] The Kuroshio current’s strong speeds and distinct thermal layers, as well as other oceanic conditions the PRC is surveying, would provide tactical advantages for underwater navigation and concealment. PRC research ships are primarily operated by civilian government agencies and universities, allowing them to conduct operations in foreign exclusive economic zones with reduced scrutiny.[41]

    CDOT-ISW previously reported similar PRC bathymetric survey operations at both ends of the Luzon Strait/Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines in April and May 2025.[42] The Bashi Channel is a strategic waterway that the PRC will likely seek to control in a blockade or invasion of Taiwan.

    Northeast Asia

    Japan

    The PRC issued a strong protest against Japan’s Defense White Paper 2025, due to its characterization of PLA activities. The Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) submitted its annual Defense White Paper to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet on July 15. The MOD expressed strong concerns over PLA activities throughout the Indo-Pacific and PRC attempts to unilaterally change the status quo, which “could seriously impact Japan’s security.”[43] The report listed specific PLA activities that present unprecedented and significant strategic challenges, to which Japan should respond comprehensively and in cooperation with allies and partners. This list included intrusions into Japanese airspace, increased military cooperation between the PRC and Russia, and activities within and beyond the first island chain. The MOD also assessed that the PRC seeks to create a fait accompli in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea through increasing military and grey zone activities.

    PRC spokesperson Lin Jian criticized the White Paper for spreading incorrect ideas about PRC behavior and the “China threat.” [44] Lin added that the Taiwan question is the PRC’s “internal affair,” and stressed that PLA activities are legitimate, justified, and consistent with international law. Lin further suggested that Japan was “talking up” regional tensions to justify its military buildup. The PRC Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Jiang Bin echoed Lin’s statement. Jiang further criticized Japan of undermining the post-war international order by walking away from its Pacifist Constitution, including raising Japan’s defense budget, loosening restrictions on arms exports, and suggesting revisions to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.[45]

    Japan protested dangerous PLA aircraft maneuvers for the second time in a month. Japan’s MOD reported that PLA JH-7 fighter-bombers made two “unusual approaches” near the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s (JASDF) YS-11EB electronic intelligence aircraft on July 9 and 10.[46] The YS-11EBs were conducting surveillance operations over the international waters of the East China Sea when the PLA aircraft came within 60 meters of the JASDF aircraft. Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Takehiro Funakoshi expressed Japan’s “serious concerns” to PRC Ambassador to Japan Wu Jianghao.[47] Funakoshi urged the PRC to halt these activities to prevent provoking accidental collisions. Japan also filed a complaint with the PRC over PLA J-15 fighter jets’ dangerous maneuvers near a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force P-3C patrol aircraft in June 2025.[48]

    PRC MND spokesperson Jiang Bin defended the PLA’s actions, claiming that the JH-7s were simply “verifying, identifying, following, and monitoring” the JASDF aircraft that were flying within the air defense identification zone (ADIZ) that the PRC established in 2013.[49] Jiang further accused the JASDF of “entering the PRC’s East China Sea ADIZ multiple times for close reconnaissance,” and attributed Japan’s close reconnaissance operations as the root cause of maritime and air collision risks.

    North Korea

    The PRC and North Korea held two high-profile and highly publicized commemorations of their mutual defense treaty, indicating a strengthening of relations between the two states. The PRC Embassy in Pyongyang celebrated the 64th anniversary of the signing of their mutual defense treaty on July 9.[50] North Korean state media reported that several high-level North Korean officials, including Vice Chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) Kang Yun Sok, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea Pak Myong Ho, and the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ri Chang Sik, were all in attendance.[51] The previous year’s celebration included only a lower-ranking official as its main representative, in stark contrast to the 2025 list of attendees. North Korea hosted a similar commemoration in Beijing on July 10.[52] Vice Chairman of the PRC National People’s Congress Wang Dongming was the celebration’s guest of honor, reflecting the elevated status of attendees at the previous day’s event.[53] PRC official coverage of the event was far more detailed than its coverage of the previous year’s celebration, likely intended to convey the increased level of importance for North Korean-PRC alignment.

    PRC-North Korean ties could be returning to 2023 levels of coordination, based on the extent of participation and coverage of these events. North Korean-PRC trade has increased 27 percent since 2024, according to official PRC customs data.[54] The PRC likely seeks to maintain its economic influence over North Korea, which has lessened somewhat as North Korea-Russia relations have deepened.

    South Korea

    The United States, South Korea, and Japan held the first Trilateral Chiefs of Defense meeting of the Lee Jae-myung administration on July 11. Official statements left out any reference to the PRC or Taiwan, which could represent South Korea’s desire to distance itself from US-Japan efforts to counter the PRC.[55] South Korean government officials confirmed that references to the PRC and Taiwan were deliberately left out of the joint statement, but stated that such concerns were still covered under the joint statement’s reference to “peace and stability within the region.”[56] The 2024 joint statement, released while the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration was in power in Seoul, explicitly decried the PRC’s “aggressive, dangerous behavior” in the South China Sea and the importance of maintaining “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”[57] Similar sentiments were also made in Japan-United States-South Korea trilateral statements in 2023.[58] The decision to omit references to the PRC and Taiwan could illustrate a South Korean rhetorical shift and possibly indicate major shifts in South Korean defense priorities. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung made clear his desire to avoid involvement in a conflict in Taiwan and pursue a more “pragmatic” foreign policy that could increase ties between Seoul and Beijing.[59] South Korean Defense Minister nominee Ahn Gyu-back stated on July 15 his desire to complete the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to South Korea.[60] OPCON transfer would allow South Korea to command combined US-South Korean forces during wartime.[61] OPCON transfer and other major changes in South Korean defense posture have not yet been reflected in Lee’s policies. These policy changes, coupled with existing rhetorical changes, would further indicate a growing divergence in South Korean and US foreign policy priorities, which could potentially harm the United States’ ability to counter PRC aggression in the Indo-Pacific.  

    Southeast Asia

    Philippines

    The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) intercepted two PLA Navy (PLAN) warships patrolling within the Philippine exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The PRC is enforcing its “Nine-Dash Line” boundary claims in defiance of a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, which Beijing rejects. The PCG flagship Teresa Magbanua tailed the PLAN surveillance ship Tianwangxing and the CCG ship 4203 on July 11 as they traced the PRC-claimed “Nine-Dash Line” east of the disputed Scarborough Shoal. The PLAN destroyer Guilin joined the other ships partway through their journey and conducted helicopter landing drills, according to PCG spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Jay Tarriela. Tarriela said that the warships ignored the PCG’s communications, while the CCG ship replied to say that the PRC has sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters.[62] Scarborough Shoal is an uninhabited atoll that the PRC seized from the Philippines in 2012 and has controlled with CCG ships ever since. It has been a frequent site of PRC-Philippines confrontations. Beijing is increasingly using the CCG and naval ships to patrol and surveil its Nine-Dash Line boundary claim that surrounds nearly the entire South China, not just around specific islands.[63] It has also significantly increased CCG presence around Scarborough Shoal since 2024.[64] The primacy of the CCG in this effort is intended to give the impression that the PRC’s activities are normal law enforcement operations within PRC waters, rather than military coercion against other countries.

    The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a statement on July 12, the ninth anniversary of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, explaining its opposition to the ruling and the Philippine comments commemorating it.[65] The ruling, which resulted from a Philippines-filed suit to challenge Beijing’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, determined that the PRC’s Nine-Dash Line and “historic claims” to land and resources in the South China Sea have no legal basis.[66] The MFA reiterated its position that the ruling is an “illegal, invalid, and non-binding piece of paper” because the PRC did not agree to participate in the arbitration and because the ruling was allegedly inconsistent with international maritime law. [67] It stressed that it was committed to implementing the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, however, and negotiating a binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea with ASEAN.

     

    [1] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2025/07/15/2003840303

    [2] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/editorials/archives/2025/05/20/2003837173

    [3] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202507140082.aspx

    [4] https://x.com/Focus_Taiwan/status/1944944307841949834

    [5] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6156420; https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2022/10/31/2003788002

    [6] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202507120008

    [7] https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-boat-naval-officer-203220df7667c81d302fd116fde70735

    [8] https://focustaiwan dot tw/society/202507100012

    [9] https://www.ft.com/content/4dcc9154-a50d-4877-88f9-3921e3994ebc

    [10][10] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6155915

    [11] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2025/07/10/2003840040

    [12] https://www.msn.com/en-us/politics/government/taiwan-deploys-himars-patriot-stinger-weapons-in-china-invasion-exercise/ar-AA1IAFaH?ocid=BingNewsSerp

    [13] https://apnews.com/video/taiwan-president-highlights-growing-defense-strength-while-observing-tank-live-fire-drill-8cc931d360264c5faa7e88072e0803d8

    [14] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/03/21/2003833811

    [15] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2025/07/17/2003840419

    [16] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/xwfyr/yzxwfb/16396755.html

    [17] http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202507/t20250709_12711384.htm

    [18] https://www.cga.gov dot tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=165509&ctNode=650&mp=999

    [19] https://www.cga.gov dot tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=165523&ctNode=650&mp=999

    [20] https://www.cga.gov dot tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=165507&ctNode=650&mp=999

    [21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-june-6-2025 ;

    https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-july-3-2025

    [22] https://news.qq dot com/rain/a/20240512A04JA700

    [23] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202507/t20250711_11669707.shtml

    [24] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202507/t20250711_11669242.shtml; https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202507/t20250711_11669658.shtml; https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202507/t20250711_11669249.shtml

    [25] https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/FINAL-Joint-Communique-of-the-58th-AMM.pdf; https://www.inquirer dot net/436616/ph-raises-south-china-sea-concerns-during-code-of-conduct-talks/

    [26] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-calls-us-tariffs-bullying-urged-others-continue-with-consultation-2025-04-07/

    [27] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202507110283.aspx

    [28] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202507110253.aspx

    [29] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/paper/1715493

    [30] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2025/07/12/2003840159

    [31] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202507030166.aspx

    [32] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202507030166.aspx

    [33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-june-27-2025 ;

     https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6147163

    [34] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6022045

    [35] https://my-formosa.com dot tw/DOC_218183.htm ; https://www.dw.com/zh-hant/%E5%8F%8D%E5%85%B1%E8%AD%B7%E5%8F%B0%E8%83%BD%E8%AA%AA%E6%9C%8D%E9%81%B8%E6%B0%91%E5%97%8E%E4%B8%80%E6%96%87%E8%A7%A3%E6%9E%90%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E5%A4%A7%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D%E6%B5%AA%E6%BD%AE/a-73268259 ;

    https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/07/15/2003840319

    [36] https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Taiwan-s-KMT-defends-One-China-stance-as-no-confidence-votes-approach

    [37] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/10/world/asia/china-ships-taiwan-guam.html?searchResultPosition=1 ; https://features.csis.org/snapshots/china-research-vessel-taiwan/

    [38] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/10/world/asia/china-ships-taiwan-guam.html?searchResultPosition=1

    [39] https://web.archive.org/web/20250704030229/https://www.cas.cn/zkyzs/2020/03/241/yxdt/202003/t20200317_4737887.shtml

    https://bzxb.cqut dot edu.cn/pdfjs/web/viewer.html?file=/download.aspx?type=paper&id=1345

    [41] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/10/world/asia/china-ships-taiwan-guam.html?searchResultPosition=1 ;

    https://www.newsweek.com/china-research-ship-jia-geng-taiwan-east-coast-1922231 ;

    https://web.archive.org/web/20220611022011/http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_zzjg/moe_347/

    [42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-9-2025

    [43] https://www.mod.go dot jp/j/press/wp/wp2025/pdf/R07zenpen.pdf

    [44] mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/20250715_11671019.shtml

    [45] mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/xwfyr/fyrthhdjzw/16397227.html

    [46] https://www.mod.go dot jp/j/press/news/2025/07/10a.html

    [47] https://www.mofa.go dot jp/mofaj/press/release/pressit_000001_02397.html

    [48] https://www.mod.go dot jp/j/press/kisha/2025/0613a.html

    [49] mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/qwfb/16396631.html

    [50] https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/north-korea-sends-senior-official-to-mark-defense-pact-anniversary-with-china/?popup=signin&login=recaptcha

    [51] https://kcnawatch dot xyz/newstream/1752128035-476943336/chinese-ambassador-hosts-reception/; https://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/G0xwM3HACQhavGzqPpZqxg

    [52] https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/north-korea-hosts-rare-event-celebrating-china-ties-at-luxury-beijing-hotel/

    [53] http://www.news dot cn/world/20250710/1ee6c69d275d42129e3be2e040e20fc2/c.html

    [54] https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-buys-station-wagon-from-china-as-food-imports-drive-bilateral-trade/

    [55] https://www.usfk.mil/Media/Newsroom/News/Article/4241133/republic-of-korea-united-states-japan-trilateral-chiefs-of-defense-joint-press/

    [56] https://www.chosun dot com/english/national-en/2025/07/13/WFJ4VTSRWZAFTDUOM6VUF37U64/

    [57] https://www.pacom.mil/Media/NEWS/News-Article-View/Article/3843579/united-states-japan-republic-of-korea-trilateral-chiefs-of-defense-joint-press/

    [58] https://kr.usembassy.gov/081923-the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/#:~:text=We%20are%20aligned%20in%20our,now%20and%20in%20the%20future.

    [59] https://biz.chosun dot com/en/en-policy/2025/05/29/AI5CYOSIZJAOXMHJ3AF2I36UEA/

    [60] https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/defense-minister-nominee-vows-to-pursue-opcon-transfer-amid-north-korea-threats/

    [61] https://www.korea dot kr/special/policyCurationView.do?newsId=148897535

    [62] https://x.com/jaytaryela/status/1943941459658330367

    [63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-june-27-2025 ;

    https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-july-11-2025 ;

    https://amti.csis.org/holding-the-line-chinas-expanding-patrols-around-scarborough-shoal/

    [64] https://www.sealight.live/posts/china-s-expanding-control-over-scarborough-shoal

    [65] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202507/t20250711_11669705.shtml ; https://www.pna.gov dot ph/articles/1254088

    [66] https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Issue%20Brief_South%20China%20Sea%20Arbitration%20Ruling%20What%20Happened%20and%20What%27s%20Next071216.pdf

    [67] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202507/t20250711_11669705.shtml ; https://www.pna.gov dot ph/articles/1254088

    Attachments:

  • 2025-07-21-PDF-China%20Taiwan%20Weekly%20Update.pdf

    • Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 20, 2025

    by: ISW Press

     

     

     

     

    Jennie Olmsted, Daria Novikov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Lea Corticchiato, and George Barros

    July 20, 2025, 4:15 pm ET
     

    Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

    Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

    Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

    Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

    Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

    Russian officials continue to publicly reiterate that Russia is uninterested in a near-term solution to ending the war in Ukraine that does not acquiesce to Moscow’s demands. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 20 that Russia is ready to "move quickly" with peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine but that Russia must achieve its goals, which Peskov claimed are “obvious” and “do not change.”[1] Kremlin officials have consistently claimed that any peace settlement must eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war and repeated Russia's original war aims to "denazify" and "demilitarize" Ukraine – terms the Kremlin has used throughout the war to call for regime change in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality, changes to NATO's open-door policy, and the removal of Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[2] Peskov’s July 20 statements underline the Kremlin's continued uninterest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and efforts rather to prolong the war — as ISW continues to assess.[3]

    German and Ukrainian officials assessed that Russia continues to expand its production of Shahed-type drones in order to launch even larger long-range drone strike packages that include up to 2,000 drones in a single night. Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue. The head of the German Ministry of Defense's Planning and Command Staff, Major General Christian Freuding, assessed on July 19 that Russia plans to further increase its drone production capacity with the goal of launching 2,000 drones in one overnight strike package against Ukraine.[4] Freuding stated that Ukraine and its international partners must consider cost-effective ways of countering Russia's large strike packages, as traditional air defense methods, such as those that use expensive Patriot interceptors, are not well-suited as an anti-drone air defense strategy. Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Major Robert Brovdi stated on July 4 that Russia could launch 1,000 drones in a single strike package due to increased production and stockpiles.[5] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assessed on June 9 that Russian can produce roughly 170 Shahed-type drones per day and that Russia plans to increase production capacity to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025.[6] Russia has been rapidly increasing the number of Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones in its overnight strike packages in recent weeks, with Russia's largest drone strike package thus far including 728 drones on the night of July 8 to 9.[7] Russia's increased production capacities in recent months have allowed Russia to dramatically increase its strike packages in a relatively short period of time. Russia rarely launched more than 200 drones per night between January and May 2025 but then increased the peak number of drones launched in one night from 250 in late May 2025 to over 700 in early July 2025. Russia’s use of one-way attack drones in nightly strike packages grew at an average monthly rate of 31 percent in both June and July 2025. ISW assesses that Russia may be able to launch up to 2,000 drones in one night by November 2025, should this current growth trend in drone usage continue. This forecast will be invalidated if the monthly Russian drone usage growth rate either increases or decreases from 31 percent. Russian forces will likely not be able to sustain such large strike packages every night but will likely launch large strike packages followed by days of smaller packages as they are now. Western investment in Ukraine's interceptor drone development and production remains critical for Ukraine's ability to counter large-scale Russian strike packages and protect its civilian population.

    Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated demands for Russia to take responsibility for the December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane, an incident that continues to create tension in the Russian-Azerbaijani relationship. Aliyev stated during a media forum on July 19 that he wants Russia to publicly acknowledge responsibility for downing the Azerbaijan Airlines plane in December 2024, punish those responsible, and compensate victims' families and Azerbaijan Airlines.[8] Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan knows "exactly what happened" and "can prove it" and that Azerbaijan has not received any response from Russian officials in the past seven months. Aliyev denied the possibility that a Ukrainian drone struck the plane and stated that Azerbaijan's Prosecutor General regularly requests Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin to provide updates on Russia's internal investigation into the downing. Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan is willing to wait 10 years for answers — a reference to the 10-year investigation into Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, which pro-Russian proxies downed using a Buk missile system belonging to the Russian 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade over occupied Donetsk Oblast in July 2014.[9] Aliyev reiterated his support for Ukraine and stated that Ukraine should "never accept occupation." Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated over a number of smaller-scale incidents in July 2024 that have inflamed the unresolved disputes over the December 2024 downing.[10]

    Key Takeaways:

     

    We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

    Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

    Russian forces conducted limited attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 19 and 20.[11]

    Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

    Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

     

    Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[12]

    Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces south of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[13]

    Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City) and west of Yablunivka.[14]

    Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Yunakivka, and Varachyne on July 19 and 20.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Yunakivka.[16]

    A Ukrainian reserve officer reported that elements of the Russian 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both of the Pacific Fleet), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), 76th and 106th airborne (VDV) divisions, and the 11th and 83rd separate VDV brigades are operating in the Sumy direction and assessed that the Russian military command typically deploys these more elite units to areas that it expects Russian forces to advance given these units' superior combat capabilities relative to other regular Russian units.[17] The Ukrainian reserve officer assessed that the presence of these elements in the Sumy direction indicates that the Russian military command is not simply trying to pin and stretch Ukrainian forces in the area.

    A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces are constantly attacking in Kindrativka and that both maintain positions in the settlement.[18] The milblogger claimed that there are many contested “gray zones” in the settlement that both Ukrainian and Russian forces try to penetrate and that it is "impossible" to assess the situation on the ground.

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kindrativka.[19] Elements of the 76th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Yunakivka.[20] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade are reportedly operating in Kindrativka.[21] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions along the Sumy Oblast border.[22]

    Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

    Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City).[23]

    Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on July 19 and 20.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[25]

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) and Huryev Kazachok (northwest of Kharkiv City).[26]

    A Russian milblogger claimed on July 19 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in the Velykyi Burluk direction near Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[27]

    Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

     

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk) and toward Kutkivka (north of Kupyansk).[28]

    Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast along the international border near Stroivka and toward Boholivka; and north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Radkivka, and Holubivka on July 19 and 20.[29]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 20 but did not advance.

    Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on July 19 and 20.[30]

    Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova).[31]

    Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

    Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Lypove (north of Lyman).[32]

     

    Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 19 and 20.[33]

    The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are now conducting infantry assaults, in contrast to 2024 when Russian forces would conduct mechanized assaults.[34] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces have a manpower advantage but that most of the forces are ill-prepared for assaults.

    Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)



    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 20 but did not advance.

    Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, Bilohorivka, and Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on July 19 and 20.[35]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[36] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with the claimed seizure, but another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement.[37] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced west and northwest of Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[38]

    Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on July 19 and 20.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Predtechyne.[40]

    Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) and 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC) are reportedly operating near Bila Hora.[41]

    Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

     

    Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk).[42]

    Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Yablunivka and advanced west of Popiv Yar (both northwest of Toretsk) and west of and within Oleksandro-Kalynove.[43] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including elements of its 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment, seized Yablunivka.[44]

    Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, and Popiv Yar and toward Katerynivka and Nelipivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on July 19 and 20.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yablunivka.[46]

    Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups and that two to three personnel in the group often carry wooden ladders in order to cross anti-tank ditches.[47]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Russian forces advanced to Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[48]

    Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Fedorivka and Novotoretske and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, and Myrolyubivka and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne and toward Molodetske on July 19 and 20.[49]

    Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction are using more drones and actively conducting guided glide bomb strikes in order to soften Ukrainian positions and create chaos, allowing Russian forces on motorcycles to try to gain a foothold.[50]

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[51] Drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk).[52]

    Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

     

    Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka).[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are advancing near Zelenyi Hai.[54]

    Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast, north, and west of Yalta (south of Novopavlivka) and south of Zelenyi Hai.[55]

    Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Yalta, and Zaporizhzhia and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Myrne, Tovste, Zelenyi Hai, and Voskresenka and toward Andriivka-Klevtsove (formerly Iskra) and Oleksandrohrad on July 19 and 20.[56]

    A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated on June 20 that Russian forces have intensified assaults in recent days and have not used equipment or motorcycles in assaults over the last seven to 10 days (since July 10 to 13).[57] The servicemember and Trehubov reported that Russian units are submitting inaccurate reports to their commanders claiming that Russian forces seized settlements – a systemic issue among Russian forces.[58]

    Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Novopavlivka direction.[59] Elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Piddubne (southwest of Novopavlivka), Myrne, and Oleksandrohrad.[60] Drone operators of the 14th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Yanvarske (southwest of Novopavlivka).[61]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 20 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Maliivka and Komyshuvakha and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novopil and toward Temyrivka on July 19 and 20.[62]

    Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 20 but did not advance.

    Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 19 and 20.[63]

    Ukrainian Volunteer Army's Southern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk reported on July 20 that Malynivka is a contested "gray zone."[64]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 20 but did not advance.

     

    Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in northwestern Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[65]

     

    Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Kamyanske; and west of Orikhiv near Plavni on July 19 and 20.[66]

    Bratchuk reported that Russian attacks are less intense in the Zaporizhia direction but that Russian forces are submitting false reports to their superiors about their advances.[67] Bratchuk stated that a newly formed Russian motorized rifle regiment based in Chechnya recently arrived in the Zaporizhia direction and that members of the regiment are frequently deserting their positions.

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[68]

    Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction, including on the islands in the Dnipro River, on July 19 and 20 but did not advance.[69]

     

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[70]

    Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

    Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 57 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities: Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 18 drones and that seven drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian strikes primarily targeted Zaporizhzhia City and frontline areas in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts.[72]

    Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

    Nothing significant to report.

    Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

     

    [1]https://t.me/tass_agency/326203; https://t.me/tass_agency/326204; https://t.me/tass_agency/326205; https://t.me/tass_agency/326206; https://t.me/tass_agency/326214; https://t.me/tass_agency/326223; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/4179 ; https://ria dot ru/20250720/peskov-2030253279.html

    [2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825

    [3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225

    [4] https://suspilne dot media/1070947-rosia-planue-zapuskati-po-ukraini-do-2000-bpla-odnocasno-nimeckij-general/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KtgNJqp-6BA; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-may-launch-2-000-drones-simultaneously-on-ukraine-german-general/

    [5] https://www.facebook.com/Brovdi.Art/posts/pfbid02SGrww2LoeDuTrg6gn5w6sfNqW6unW9UM1QJsqEwYFS4fRjDZpyUK8EDgrzrPsmnql?rdid=FpSUA9lEOr4PkOjr#

    [6] https://mezha dot media/oboronka/chi-bude-1000-shahediv-za-nich-302439/

    [7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062925

    [8] https://president dot az/en/articles/view/69421

    [9] https://www.britannica.com/event/Malaysia-Airlines-flight-17

    [10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070125 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025

    [11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843

    [12] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1946939806673486221; https://t.me/morpex_V/5303; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10305

    [13] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1946954017856168029; https://t.me/skala425/625

    [14] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39073; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96144; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954

    [15] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39100; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96144; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66039; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39053; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39091

    [16] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96144; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39053

    [17] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1946586755836068094

    [18] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39100

    [19] https://t.me/dva_majors/75714; https://t.me/dva_majors/75718

    [20] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39053

    [21] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1946939806673486221; https://t.me/morpex_V/5303; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10305; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39100

    [22] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173084 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173091

    [23] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66037

    [24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114

    [25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66037

    [26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173084 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173091

    [27] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66037

    [28] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32074 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954

    [29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39054

    [30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114

    [31] https://t.me/voin_dv/16077

    [32] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29741 ; https://t.me/ombr66/1873

    [33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114

    [34] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeIpue9cK-8 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/20/yak-targany-lizut-na-lymanshhyni-vorog-vidmovyvsya-vid-tehniky-j-perejshov-do-myasnyh-shturmiv/

    [35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114

    [36] https://t.me/tass_agency/326209; https://t.me/mod_russia/54837; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96180

    [37] https://t.me/yurasumy/24027; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39075; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39076

    [38] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32059

    [39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31516

    [40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39079

    [41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39076; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39079

    [42] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1946898059612352884 ; https://t.me/IronHelmets/4449

    [43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96155; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32065 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66040; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39064

    [44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39064

    [45] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954

    [46] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66040

    [47] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1071141-armia-rf-vikoristovue-drabini-sob-perepravlatis-cerez-protitankovi-rvi-na-napramku-ablunivki-ta-oleksandro-kalinovogo/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-mwW_smfVas&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8

    [48] https://t.me/rusich_army/24778

    [49] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39083; https://t.me/rusich_army/24778

    [50] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1071043-informacijni-fejki-ta-ataki-dronami-ak-rf-namagaetsa-prorvati-oboronu-zsu-na-doneccini-osuv-hortica/

     

    [51] https://t.me/dva_majors/75678; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39056 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39080

    [52] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14062

    [53] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29738; https://t.me/sicariofly/69

    [54] https://t.me/voin_dv/16076

    [55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39070

    [56] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66038 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16063 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24778

    [57] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1070967-poloneni-majze-sodna-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku-rf-aktivizuvala-pihotni-sturmi-bez-tehniki-ale-z-dronami/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8

    [58] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1071043-informacijni-fejki-ta-ataki-dronami-ak-rf-namagaetsa-prorvati-oboronu-zsu-na-doneccini-osuv-hortica/ ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1070967-poloneni-majze-sodna-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku-rf-aktivizuvala-pihotni-sturmi-bez-tehniki-ale-z-dronami/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2024

    [59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96153

    [60] https://t.me/voin_dv/16067 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39085

    [61] https://t.me/voin_dv/16072

    [62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16063

    [63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02phZdGjfj9piR7z32dVceNHDyHZKFaFUyQ9TFo15gKTxGXxNJ3Ntc6SLBN9WXwAEpl?__cft__[0]=AZX4AnAMFKGBILGyLZKvny2TE2CkdBpsbeuO40TY00-_BXdGDoezXbNi2Q8319u6YhTLdP7H0rMre3PTMsKDWvE9Sj3_py3yhbySecR9k1heoTdo-alo7FXsLBouRTJEvmOhxkFNrf_JhQQWXlQQeqF6q-3U4jYET194tbn8NDSx8PtGsMFf2B7v7KxolBXHoRc&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114

     ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843

     

    [64] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeIpue9cK-8 ; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/07/20/pivnichnokavkazka-rodzynka-kadyrivczi-znykayut-i-tikayut-odrazu-pislya-prybuttya-na-zaporizhzhya/

    [65] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1946932349096153481 https://t.me/frontbird/23988

    [66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02phZdGjfj9piR7z32dVceNHDyHZKFaFUyQ9TFo15gKTxGXxNJ3Ntc6SLBN9WXwAEpl?__cft__[0]=AZX4AnAMFKGBILGyLZKvny2TE2CkdBpsbeuO40TY00-_BXdGDoezXbNi2Q8319u6YhTLdP7H0rMre3PTMsKDWvE9Sj3_py3yhbySecR9k1heoTdo-alo7FXsLBouRTJEvmOhxkFNrf_JhQQWXlQQeqF6q-3U4jYET194tbn8NDSx8PtGsMFf2B7v7KxolBXHoRc&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

     ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954

    [67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeIpue9cK-8 ; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/07/20/pivnichnokavkazka-rodzynka-kadyrivczi-znykayut-i-tikayut-odrazu-pislya-prybuttya-na-zaporizhzhya/

    [68] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96148

    [69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02phZdGjfj9piR7z32dVceNHDyHZKFaFUyQ9TFo15gKTxGXxNJ3Ntc6SLBN9WXwAEpl?__cft__[0]=AZX4AnAMFKGBILGyLZKvny2TE2CkdBpsbeuO40TY00-_BXdGDoezXbNi2Q8319u6YhTLdP7H0rMre3PTMsKDWvE9Sj3_py3yhbySecR9k1heoTdo-alo7FXsLBouRTJEvmOhxkFNrf_JhQQWXlQQeqF6q-3U4jYET194tbn8NDSx8PtGsMFf2B7v7KxolBXHoRc&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

     ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeIpue9cK-8 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/20/pivnichnokavkazka-rodzynka-kadyrivczi-znykayut-i-tikayut-odrazu-pislya-prybuttya-na-zaporizhzhya/

    [70] https://t.me/dva_majors/75698

    [71] https://t.me/kpszsu/38872

    [72] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=593683207134618; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1070929-rosijska-armia-atakuvala-slovansk-sahedami-zaginula-ludina/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15880 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/20/nichna-ataka-shahediv-na-harkivshhynu-shestero-poranenyh-poshkodzheno-budynky-ta-avto/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/20/vorog-znovu-bye-po-izyumu-poraneni-dvi-zhinky-poshkodzheni-budynky-j-pidpryyemstvo/ ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1071097-zaginula-moa-mama-78-rokiv-meskanci-orlivki-na-sumsini-rozpovili-pro-rosijsku-ataku-sahedami/

     

     

    Attachments:

  • Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20June%2020%2C%202025%20%28PDF%29.pdf

    • Iran Update, July 20, 2025

    by: ISW Press

     

     

     

     

    Katherine Wells, Ben Schmida, Andie Parry, and Annika Ganzeveld

    Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

    The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

    Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

    Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

    CTP-ISW will publish an abbreviated Iran Update on July 19 and 20 and will resume full coverage on July 21.

    Key Takeaways:

    Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated Tasnim News Agency confirmed that senior E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) and Iranian diplomats agreed to discuss Iran’s nuclear program “next week.”[1] Tasnim reported that the parties have agreed on the “principle of talks” but that the timing and location of the talks are not finalized.[2] A German diplomatic source confirmed to Agence France-Presse that the E3 are in contact with Iran to schedule talks for the coming week.[3] Tasnim reported that the talks will take place at the deputy foreign minister level.[4] The E3 has warned that it may trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if Iran does not deliver unspecified “concrete results” by the end of August.[5] An Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member said on July 20 that parliament would respond with “severe countermeasures” if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[6] The E3 would have to initiate the process to impose snapback sanctions by September 3 to complete the process before the mechanism expires in October 2025.[7]

    A senior Iranian military commander claimed on July 20 that Iran has replaced air defense systems that Israel destroyed during the Israel-Iran War. Iranian Artesh Operations Deputy Rear Admiral Mahmoud Mousavi told Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media on July 20 that Israel damaged “some” Iranian air defense systems during the war.[8] Israel destroyed Iranian air defense systems and radars throughout the war to establish air superiority over Iran. Previous Israeli airstrikes on Iran in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four Russian-made S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[9] Mousavi claimed that the Iranian armed forces replaced the destroyed systems with existing and new systems.[10] CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is very unlikely that Russia has supplied Iran with new S-300 systems, so Iran has likely replaced damaged air defense systems with domestically produced systems.[11] Iran tested its domestically produced Bavar-373 air defense system in March 2025.[12] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Ali Reza Sabahi Fard announced in March that Iran would soon unveil a new version of the Bavar-373.[13] Iran has yet to publicly unveil the new version, however. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may prioritize developing indigenous air defense systems given that Russia is unlikely to supply Iran with S-300s in the near future.[14] Iran's domestically produced air defense systems failed to prevent Israel from achieving air superiority during the Israel-Iran War and it is therefore unlikely that the same systems would effectively defend Iran against another conventional conflict with Israel or the United States.

    Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani discussed the Iranian nuclear program with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on July 20.[15] Iranian media did not provide details about the meeting, but the Kremlin stated that Larijani presented Iran’s views on the “current escalation” in the Middle East and the Iranian nuclear program. Larijani’s visit to Russia is notable given reports in January 2025 that Larijani had made frequent visits to Moscow to seek Russian assistance with the Iranian nuclear program and air defense capabilities.[16] The visit is also notable given Iran’s reported dissatisfaction with Russian support for Iran during the Israel-Iran War. Iranian media reported on July 15 that Iran will likely maintain ties with Russia but must “rethink parts of the relationship and expand cooperation with other partners,” especially in “sensitive military and strategic areas.”[17] Moscow has offered to mediate between Iran and the United States and has reportedly encouraged Iran to accept a nuclear deal with the United States in which Iran would halt domestic uranium enrichment.[18] Russia reportedly offered to provide Iran with 3.67 enriched uranium to support a civil nuclear program, presumably in return for Iran agreeing to stop domestic uranium enrichment.[19] Russia previously accepted 11,000 kilograms of enriched uranium from Iran in exchange for natural uranium in December 2015 as part of the JCPOA.[20] Neither the United States nor Iran has accepted Russia’s offers regarding the Iranian nuclear program.

    Syrian transitional government and Suwaydawi forces continued to implement the US-brokered ceasefire in Suwayda Province on July 20 despite sporadic clashes and a Druze faction’s rejection of the deployment of government forces to Suwayda. US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack announced on July 20 that, as of 17:00 Damascus time (10:00 ET), all parties had ceased hostilities.[21] Barrack added that a prisoner exchange between Druze and Bedouin factions was imminent. The United States brokered a ceasefire agreement between the Syrian transitional government and Israel on July 18.[22] The agreement reportedly returns control of Suwayda Province to the Syrian transitional government. Government forces continued to deploy to Suwayda Province on July 20 as part of the ceasefire agreement.[23] Prominent Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri condemned government forces’ deployment to Suwayda Province on July 20 and demanded their immediate withdrawal, despite government forces’ deployment being part of the first phase of the agreement.[24] The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) began implementing the second phase of the three-phase ceasefire on July 19. This phase includes the opening of a humanitarian corridor and a prisoner exchange between Druze and Bedouin factions.[25] Hijri confirmed that a prisoner swap would take place between Druze and Bedouin factions on July 20.[26] A pro-government Syrian journalist reported on July 20 that the prisoner exchange was not carried out, however, and that clashes between Druze and Bedouin fighters have resumed.[27] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim.

    CTP-ISW will provide further analysis about the ceasefire in Syria in its July 21 Iran Update.

    [1] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/29/3358265

    [2] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/29/3358265

    [3] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/iran-to-hold-nuclear-talks-with-european-powers-within-days-reports/

    [4] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/29/3358265

    [5] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europeans-warn-iran-un-sanctions-if-no-concrete-progress-nuclear-issue-2025-07-17/  ; https://www.axios.com/2025/07/15/iran-snapback-sanctions-nuclear-deal

    [6] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/29/3358449

    [7] https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf

    [8] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/763554

    [9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran

    [10] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/763554

    [11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-2-2025

    [12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-3-2025 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/17/3251865

    [13] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/729897

    [14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-3-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-10-2025

    [15] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77474

    [16] https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/iran-russia-nuclear-talks-deal-lfzbdh7z7

    [17] https://farhikhtegandaily dot com/page/269777

    [18] https://www.axios.com/2025/07/12/putin-iran-nuclear-deal-uranium-enrichment

    [19] https://www.axios.com/2025/07/12/putin-iran-nuclear-deal-uranium-enrichment

    [20] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/28/iran-ships-uranium-russia-nuclear-deal

    [21] https://x.com/USAMBTurkiye/status/1946936064360497273 

    [22] https://x.com/USAMBTurkiye/status/1946333767918080341

    [23] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1946847222470988268 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-19-2025

    [24] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02myRiyGp4sear2gRSe9jZQEkuv9xTDwnvXpA3dZVaHZJ4EfqtReCEzAsThHLpRFQcl&id=100089249525829 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-19-2025

    [25] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1946614190103286064 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1946843486361428175

    [26] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02myRiyGp4sear2gRSe9jZQEkuv9xTDwnvXpA3dZVaHZJ4EfqtReCEzAsThHLpRFQcl&id=100089249525829 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1946924309068337390

    [27] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1946971189403963775 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1946967557199876296 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1946961431498207302

     

    Attachments:

  • Iran%20Update%2C%20July%2020%2C%202025%20PDF.pdf

    • Iran Update, July 19, 2025

    by: ISW Press

     

     

     

     

     

    Johanna Moore, Avery Borens, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, and Annika Ganzeveld

    Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

    The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

    Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

    Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

    CTP-ISW will publish an abbreviated Iran Update on July 19 and 20 and will resume full coverage on July 21.


    Key Takeaways:

     

    Israel and Syria agreed to a ceasefire in southern Syria on July 18 that reportedly returns control of Suwayda Province to the Syrian transitional government.[1] An unidentified Interior Ministry official reported that the ceasefire will be implemented in three phases.[2] Transitional government forces will deploy to Suwayda in the first phase to oversee disengagement between Druze and Bedouin fighters.[3] The official stated that an emergency committee comprised of Syrian transitional government officials will simultaneously oversee the delivery of humanitarian aid and provision of basic services to civilians in Suwayda Province as well as monitor the repair of infrastructure as part of the second phase.[4] The Interior Ministry official stated that the third phase will begin after “calm” is restored in Suwayda Province.[5] The third phase will activate state-run institutions, gradually redeploy government forces to Suwayda Province, and integrate Suwaydawi institutions into the Syrian state. These provisions are similar to the ones that were included in the July 16 ceasefire agreement, which was rejected by prominent Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri.[6]

    Syrian President Ahmed al Shara sought to secure the support of the Druze and Sunni Bedouin for the ceasefire during a speech on July 19 by making references to these communities’ history and identity.[7] Shara criticized Hijri’s movement for having “separatist ambitions,” seeking support from abroad, and acting counter to Syrian values and interests. Shara called on Syrians not to judge all Druze based on the actions of a few. He lauded the “noble values” of Bedouin tribes and their history of standing by the Syrian state. Shara stated that the motives for these tribes to take unilateral action to defend themselves are understandable, but cautioned that these actions cannot be an alternative to state intervention to restore security. Shara reiterated the transitional government’s stated commitment to protecting minorities and holding any and all perpetrators of violence accountable.

    Hijri, other Druze factions, and Sunni Bedouin tribes have agreed to the Israel-Syria ceasefire in southern Syria. Hijri, who has rejected three ceasefire agreements in the past week, called for his supporters to adhere to the ceasefire agreement.[8] Hijri stated that Syrian government forces would deploy to Suwayda Province’s borders to establish checkpoints.[9] The checkpoints are meant to prevent any parties from entering border villages for 48 hours to allow security forces to deploy to the province and allow Bedouin tribesmen who had traveled to Suwayda to leave the province safely.[10] Under the ceasefire agreement, Busra al Sham and Busra al Harir are designated as safe crossings.[11] Hijri asserted that any party that violates the agreement bears full responsibility for its collapse.[12] It is unclear at this time whether Hijri or his forces will adhere to the ceasefire.

    Several Druze and Bedouin groups have welcomed the ceasefire agreement. An unspecified spokesperson for Syrian Bedouin tribes told Syrian media on July 19 that the Bedouin tribes support the Syrian government and have stopped sending tribal fighters to Suwayda.[13] The Southern Tribes Gathering also expressed its commitment to the ceasefire agreement.[14] Prominent Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, who has led much of the fighting against the transitional government, called for an end to the clashes and fighting on July 18.[15]

    Government forces have deployed to towns in Suwayda Province as part of the first phase of the ceasefire agreement. Forces deployed to al Mazraa, Walgha, and the outskirts of Suwayda City on July 19.[16] Syrian media reported that fighting continued in Suwayda on July 19 as internal security forces deployed to the province.[17] Geolocated footage posted on July 19 reportedly shows clashes between unspecified armed factions along the Suwayda-Walgha highway in northwestern Suwayda City.[18] Southern Syria-based media posted footage of clashes between Sunni Bedouin fighters and Druze fighters in an unspecified area of Suwayda City.[19] A Turkish analyst posted footage reportedly showing fighting between Sunni Bedouin fighters and Druze fighters loyal to Druze leader Hikmat al Hijri at the al Omran junction in Suwayda City.[20] Sunni Bedouin and Druze fighters continue to contest control of neighborhoods in northern and western Suwayda City at the time of this writing.[21]

    CTP-ISW will provide further analysis about the ceasefire in Syria in its updates in the coming days.

    Axios reported on July 19 that senior E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) and Iranian diplomats are expected to meet in Europe next week to discuss a possible nuclear deal, citing unspecified sources.[22] Iran has not softened its position on its right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil, which makes it unlikely that Iran will accept a nuclear deal that includes a zero uranium enrichment demand. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Chinese media on July 19 that Iran is “not convinced yet” to resume nuclear negotiations.[23] Araghchi added that the United States must show a “real intention” to achieve a “win-win solution.”[24] Iranian officials, including a senior adviser to the Supreme Leader, have similarly signaled caution about talks and reiterated that Iran will not accept a zero uranium enrichment demand.[25] The E3 has warned that it may trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if Iran does not deliver unspecified “concrete results” by the end of August.[26] The E3 would have to initiate the process to impose snapback sanctions by September 3 to complete the process before the mechanism expires in October 2025.[27]

    [1] https://x.com/USAMBTurkiye/status/1946333767918080341

    [2] https://t.me/sana_gov/133961 ; https://t.me/sana_gov/133962 ; https://t.me/sana_gov/133963

    [3] https://t.me/sana_gov/133961

    [4] https://t.me/sana_gov/133962

    [5] https://t.me/sana_gov/133963

    [6] https://t.me/sana_gov/133963

    [7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fcmdTjCGzvM ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fcmdTjCGzvM

    [8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025 ; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=738370245814620&id=100089249525829&__cft__[0]=AZV_JQi1qasrLHzFbEuajzTsZtJHa0GYOJDgPsL6gKVKBeqE1u8JTIXfMGRIzwXV33max-4z-WygC4m2qSnRhCAbdKQ0WeW1wsKNDCs2QlU5jMmDheTLz_goMfo5R2qvgwhy9gaVa9r0n_sDQXTjmiuZKSYMOeHh5D-8IoO4RP-Jtw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://x.com/azelin/status/1945498502747828253 ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1945507509038408088

     

    [9] https://t.me/damascusv011/33187 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1B5MCF18zD/?mibextid=wwXIfr

    [10] https://t.me/damascusv011/33187 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1B5MCF18zD/?mibextid=wwXIfr

    [11] https://t.me/damascusv011/33187 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1B5MCF18zD/?mibextid=wwXIfr

    [12] https://t.me/damascusv011/33187 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1B5MCF18zD/?mibextid=wwXIfr

    [13] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1946541596888932856

    [14] https://sana dot sy/?p=2250363 ; https://x.com/MTVEnglishNews/status/1946503929665073366 ; https://asharq dot com/sub-live/politics/43106/رغم-اتفاق-وقف-إطلاق-النار-في-السويداء-الاشتباكات-مستمرة/

    [15] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CRVLeZ41r/?mibextid=wwXIfr

    [16] https://t.me/sana_gov/133956 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/25057 ; https://t.me/Euphrats_post/95196

    [17] https://t.me/sana_gov/133965 ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/1175862074583601?__cft__[0]=AZWvvVeuq74_Q0_16bREvBVI2u2ycCfO_zLvcz41Hl_jRJZ2xmvWcHpYQnxRwpDS1vPJOuyDW-BW4IpdOLdrk1rKTPGWkIendjVPCjDuur7Jh0PsZtqnOZ9kWSjDRLKNx2Jb-jT46jhBKFT0xgYstkTMvP7y-sZc9PbMzs8JkMPNXA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

    [18] https://x.com/RojavaNetwork/status/1946550009891070363 ; https://x.com/andynovy/status/1946562606103142874

    [19] https://t.me/Euphrats_post/95206

    [20] https://x.com/leventkemaI/status/1946508075571020017

    [21] https://t.me/Euphrats_post/95208 ; https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1946614665678852554

    [22] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1946209642452828527

    [23] https://x.com/Frontlinestory/status/1946509816802988042 ;

    https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/28/3357621

    [24] https://x.com/Frontlinestory/status/1946509816802988042 ;

    https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/28/3357621

    [25] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6529656 ;

    https://www.yjc dot ir/fa/news/8970859/ ;

    https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/11/3346705/ ;

    https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2088263/

    [26] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europeans-warn-iran-un-sanctions-if-no-concrete-progress-nuclear-issue-2025-07-17/ ;

    https://www.axios.com/2025/07/15/iran-snapback-sanctions-nuclear-deal

    [27] https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf

    Attachments:

  • Iran%20Update%2C%20July%2019%2C%202025%20PDF.pdf

    • Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 19, 2025

    by: ISW Press





    Jennie Olmsted, Angelica Evans, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, and Kateryna Stepanenko

    July 19, 2025, 4:00 pm ET 

    Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

    Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

    Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

    Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

    Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on July 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

    Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 12 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh, Kursk, and Rostov oblasts and occupied Crimea; eight Iskander-K cruise missiles from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and 15 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched around 200 Shahed-type drones and 144 decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasondar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 208 total projectiles, including 185 Shahed-type drones, seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, seven Iskander-K cruise missiles, and nine Kh-101 cruise missiles; and that seven cruise missiles and 129 decoy drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five missiles and 30 drones struck 12 unspecified locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes damaged critical infrastructure in Sumy Oblast and left thousands without power, and that Russian drones and missiles struck Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and damaged vital infrastructure.[2] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported that Russia’s overnight strike was the largest combined strike package against Pavlohrad since Russia's initial push into Ukraine in February 2022.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck industrial, educational, and civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[4]

    Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated on July 18 that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky agreed on future US investment in Ukrainian drone production and US purchases of Ukrainian drones.[5] Svyrydenko stated that Ukrainian Defense Minister Denis Shmyhal will continue technical agreements with US counterparts and that Ukraine and the United States plan to sign a "drone deal" and are discussing US production of Ukrainian drones. Zelensky told the New York Post in an article published on July 17 that he discussed a "mega-deal" with Trump that would see the United States purchase Ukrainian drones alongside Ukrainian purchases of US-made weapons.[6] Ukrainian drone companies have developed a weeks-long innovation cycle over the last three and a half years of war that quickly responds to Russian drone adaptations, and Ukraine's Western allies will significantly benefit from partnering with Ukrainian innovators who are familiar with the modern realities of conventional warfare.

    Key Takeaways:

    We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

    Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

    Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 18 and 19.[7]

    A Ukrainian drone regiment reported on July 18 that drone operators struck a Russian Tor air defense system in the Kursk direction.[8]

    Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 19 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka on July 19.[9] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Oleksiivka.[10]

    Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka, and elements of the 76th and 106th airborne (VDV) divisions are reportedly operating near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[11] Drone operators of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in northern Sumy Oblast.[12]

    Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

    Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

    Russian forces continued assaults in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 19 but did not advance.

    Russian forces continued assaults north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on July 18 and 19.[13]

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur Rifle Battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[14] Drone operators of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly struck Ukrainian positions near Stohnii (northwest of Kharkiv City).[15]

    Russian forces continued assaults in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dehtyarne (north of Velykyi Burluk) and from Milove toward Khatnie and Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[16]

    Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Milove.[17]

    Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing from Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk) toward Kutkivka (west of Dvorichna) and that Russian forces advanced northwest of Stepova Novoselivka (east of Kupyansk).[18] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Stepova Novoselivka.[19]

    Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk along the international border near Boholivka; north of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, Kindrashivka, and Holubivka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Stepova Novoselivka on July 18 and 19.[20]

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[21]

    Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reportedly activity in the Borova direction on July 19.

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 19 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Novyi Myr; northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and toward Korovii Yar, Serednie, and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on July 18 and 19.[22]

    Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 19 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on July 18 and 19.[23]

    Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Serebryanka.[24]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 19 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, southwest of Chasiv Yar near Mykolaivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Predtechyne, Kurdyumivka, and Andriivka on July 18 and 19.[25]

    The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces have regularly changed tactics in the Chasiv Yar direction over the last year (since mid-2024).[26] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces previously conducted intense small infantry group assaults, then leveraged vehicles during favorable weather conditions, and are now resuming small infantry group assaults, occasionally on motorcycles. The spokesperson stated that Russian prisoners of war (POWs) report that newly "mobilized" Russian personnel (likely referring to new recruits) now receive only 24 days of training prior to deploying to Ukraine and that these reinforcements are mainly penal colony recruits or individuals who signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for financial incentives.

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on July 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized central Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk) and advanced into central Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk) and near Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk).[27]

    Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Popiv Yar, Yablunivka, Kalynivka, and Poltavka, and toward Nelipivka and Stepanivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske on July 18 and 19.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove.[29]

    A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using armored and motorized vehicles to support assaults south and southeast of Oleksandro-Kalynove.[30]

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Popiv Yar and Yablunivka.[31]

    Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

    Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Mykolaivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[32]

    Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[33]

    Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Myrolyubivka, and Novokonomichne and toward Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, Shevchenko, and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne and toward Molodetske on July 18 and 19.[34]

    Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 18 that Russian forces are mainly focusing attacks on the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions, but that Ukrainian forces are holding despite intensified pressure.[35] Syrskyi reported that Russian forces continue to attack in small fire teams but are unsuccessfully trying to seize Pokrovsk. Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempting to break into Pokrovsk on July 18.

    Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[36] Drone operators of the Russian AirNomads group are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[37]

    Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

    Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Voskresenka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[38]

    Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Piddubne, Myrne, and Voskresenka and toward Oleksandrohrad on July 18 and 19.[39]

    The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on July 19 that Russian forces would previously deploy infantry assault groups of four to five, even sometimes six soldiers, but now only deploy fire teams of two to three soldiers to attack Ukrainian positions.[40] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces have stopped using motorcycles in assaults on this sector of the frontline and are now mainly using motorcycles to transport ammunition or personnel and then walking 10 to 15 kilometers to frontline positions for assaults. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are suffering significant losses in the Novopavlivka direction daily but are replenishing personnel and restoring combat capabilities quickly. The spokesperson reported that the Russian military command engages in barbaric disciplinary measures without regard for subordinates' lives, since reinforcements arrive so often.

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Maksim Krivonos Battalion (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novopavlivka, Horikhove, and Mezhova (north of Novopavlivka).[41]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) began advancing toward Temyrivka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[42]

    Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Maliivka, and Shevchenko and toward Kamyshuvaka and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novopil on July 18 and 19.[43]

    Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

    Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on July 19.

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 19 but did not advance.

    Unconfirmed claims: The all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) claimed that an LSR sabotage and reconnaissance unit advanced up to 30 kilometers behind Russian positions near occupied Velyka Bilozerka, Zaporizhia Oblast (northwest of occupied Melitopol) on July 17 and killed several members of an unspecified Chechen Akhmat unit.[44]

    Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on July 18 and 19.[45]

    Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Kamyanske.[46] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to VDV Forces), and Chechen Vostok-Akhmat Battalion reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[47]

    Russian forces continued limited attempts to cross the Dnipro River in the Kherson direction on July 19 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attempted to cross the Dnipro River northeast of Kherson City near Kozatskyi Island and toward Sadove and Prydniprovske and southwest of Kherson City near Hola Prystan and toward Dniprovske on July 18 and 19.[48]

    A Ukrainian coastal defense brigade operating in the Kherson direction stated on July 18 that it repelled a Russian vessel attempting to advance past Ukrainian positions in an unspecified area of Kherson Oblast.[49]

    Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and drone operators of the 104th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the right (west) bank of the Dnipro River.[50]

    Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

    See topline text.

    Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

    Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko expanded the Belarusian government's ability to provide additional vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Belarusian forces during mobilization and wartime.[51] Lukashenko signed a decree on July 18 that authorizes the government to seize any "means of transport," including state vehicles and privately leased vehicles, for military use during wartime. The decree defines "means of transport" as cars, trains, ships, small vessels, UAVs, motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), wheeled tractors, and heavy road building equipment.

    Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

    [1] https://t.me/kpszsu/38818

    [2] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1946461822078591261 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/19/prezydent-vorog-zastosuvav-proty-ukrayinskyh-mist-ponad-300-droniv-i-30-raket/

    [3] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/19/najmasovanisha-ataka-na-pavlograd-rosiyany-atakuyut-misto-raketamy-ta-dronamy/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22988

    [4] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/19/dvoye-lyudej-zagynulo-vnaslidok-raketnogo-udaru-rosiyan-po-dniprovshhyni/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22995 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/46315; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/19/v-odesi-pislya-rosijskogo-udaru-spalahnula-pozhezha-u-9-poverhivczi-ye-zagyblyj/; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/videos/2619294408424811/?__cft__[0]=AZUhFfx_zQEKJubirM0plkTQmXw6dwjdgs2EL3R44vz9RQdvGNfAV_zhwHfo8jKzXy0_zpv9y0trQu304yPM9nGj_Q6Nff69jAmaH4_FueJN4bYKUfACCA-M7veMrnFwuQZHzCdaLuWPFuDKP3BCyF6pRto6PKZyLKUjZD1Or8XNLKl7PNoOvwYUi1376hm66ksYtaBUYht-127XHmTqXw_y&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/truonline/6740 ; https://suspilne dot media/1070317-ukraina-ta-ssa-domovilisa-sodo-prodazu-droniv-tureccina-gotova-prijnati-tretij-raund-peregovoriv-z-rf-1242-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1752916686&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/43963 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/19/chotyry-godyny-rosiyany-atakuvaly-shostku-udarnymy-bpla/; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/246 ;

    [5] https://suspilne dot media/1070257-e-politicna-domovlenist-sviridenko-pro-ugodu-sodo-prodazu-droniv-ssa/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-ukraine-talks-drone-investment-deal-2025-07-18/

    [6] https://nypost.com/2025/07/17/us-news/trump-zelensky-discuss-drone-mega-deal-for-us-to-buy-battle-ready-ukraine-uavs/

    [7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hcH7fUbYWE5yAmpMCwtQVU1j5tKMve1m2ySiQ3YVK7tiFdpTRB9tdVRZyx71HoC2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ukaFwFF1iu2AUoSZekTvvdt6W7axmtjyHfr9cxTZTeSf88Ajk4NksQZwUeDCKbRUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0goRkSXpEEYQTpQC2qobVxf7fSBj318jeP2UFyRGpfhyFHT3dMpLiTZy3Scjp7efCl

    [8] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/18/myslyvecz-stav-zdobychchyu-ukrayinskyj-dron-vygrav-duel-iz-rosijskym-zrk-tor/; https://t.me/army_14reg/418

    [9] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39040

    [10] https://t.me/dva_majors/75642

    [11] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1946385574178234505

    [12] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31453

    [13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hcH7fUbYWE5yAmpMCwtQVU1j5tKMve1m2ySiQ3YVK7tiFdpTRB9tdVRZyx71HoC2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ukaFwFF1iu2AUoSZekTvvdt6W7axmtjyHfr9cxTZTeSf88Ajk4NksQZwUeDCKbRUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0goRkSXpEEYQTpQC2qobVxf7fSBj318jeP2UFyRGpfhyFHT3dMpLiTZy3Scjp7efCl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14035 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31445 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13642

    [14] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5848

    [15] https://t.me/epoddubny/24153 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10279

    [16] https://t.me/dva_majors/75642 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31483 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39014 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31445

    [17] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39028

    [18] https://t.me/dva_majors/75642 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39022

    [19] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39022

    [20] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14035 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0goRkSXpEEYQTpQC2qobVxf7fSBj318jeP2UFyRGpfhyFHT3dMpLiTZy3Scjp7efCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ukaFwFF1iu2AUoSZekTvvdt6W7axmtjyHfr9cxTZTeSf88Ajk4NksQZwUeDCKbRUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hcH7fUbYWE5yAmpMCwtQVU1j5tKMve1m2ySiQ3YVK7tiFdpTRB9tdVRZyx71HoC2l

    [21] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96138

    [22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hcH7fUbYWE5yAmpMCwtQVU1j5tKMve1m2ySiQ3YVK7tiFdpTRB9tdVRZyx71HoC2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ukaFwFF1iu2AUoSZekTvvdt6W7axmtjyHfr9cxTZTeSf88Ajk4NksQZwUeDCKbRUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0goRkSXpEEYQTpQC2qobVxf7fSBj318jeP2UFyRGpfhyFHT3dMpLiTZy3Scjp7efCl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14035 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75642

    [23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hcH7fUbYWE5yAmpMCwtQVU1j5tKMve1m2ySiQ3YVK7tiFdpTRB9tdVRZyx71HoC2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ukaFwFF1iu2AUoSZekTvvdt6W7axmtjyHfr9cxTZTeSf88Ajk4NksQZwUeDCKbRUl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0goRkSXpEEYQTpQC2qobVxf7fSBj318jeP2UFyRGpfhyFHT3dMpLiTZy3Scjp7efCl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14035

    [24] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39027

    [25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hcH7fUbYWE5yAmpMCwtQVU1j5tKMve1m2ySiQ3YVK7tiFdpTRB9tdVRZyx71HoC2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ukaFwFF1iu2AUoSZekTvvdt6W7axmtjyHfr9cxTZTeSf88Ajk4NksQZwUeDCKbRUl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0goRkSXpEEYQTpQC2qobVxf7fSBj318jeP2UFyRGpfhyFHT3dMpLiTZy3Scjp7efCl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14035; https://t.me/wargonzo/27933; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173030

    [26] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/19/okupanty-shturmuyut-i-zdayutsya-v-polon-u-chasovomu-yaru-tryvayut-miski-boyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo

    [27] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173030

    [28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hcH7fUbYWE5yAmpMCwtQVU1j5tKMve1m2ySiQ3YVK7tiFdpTRB9tdVRZyx71HoC2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ukaFwFF1iu2AUoSZekTvvdt6W7axmtjyHfr9cxTZTeSf88Ajk4NksQZwUeDCKbRUl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0goRkSXpEEYQTpQC2qobVxf7fSBj318jeP2UFyRGpfhyFHT3dMpLiTZy3Scjp7efCl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14035; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173030; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66022

    [29] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66022

    [30] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66022

    [31] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14060; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14061

    [32] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1946251720905908599; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6TywZx2Kvk

    [33] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32056

    [34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hcH7fUbYWE5yAmpMCwtQVU1j5tKMve1m2ySiQ3YVK7tiFdpTRB9tdVRZyx71HoC2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ukaFwFF1iu2AUoSZekTvvdt6W7axmtjyHfr9cxTZTeSf88Ajk4NksQZwUeDCKbRUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0goRkSXpEEYQTpQC2qobVxf7fSBj318jeP2UFyRGpfhyFHT3dMpLiTZy3Scjp7efCl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14035 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75642

    [35] https://t.me/osirskiy/1227; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/19/vorog-bezsylyj-oleksandr-syrskyj-rozpoviv-pro-taktyku-voroga-poblyzu-pokrovska/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/19/vorog-bezsylyj-oleksandr-syrskyj-rozpoviv-pro-taktyku-voroga-poblyzu-pokrovska/ ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1946242827366903970 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02q7hTSHppV68tpJn7Gq1zxwqrGRHZdPF4TwiwM35FcZRQhczWmBZHTwkErF9eCEail?__cft__[0]=AZUQjEHT-A7Jve5jzE_J2Enuug6rUGlW_tETQjPeYCWNnla7XOBD8DbNxNYTR8Py9ahycsbp3Dmxg2ZNnzD0bv0lzXbZtCzIu7p72Q9zNJ9du3iPnY_aN2OgM9owikPMLA746P6uUBcGIgq2okC5uU0O-yeFo0SGDLtBOxydrlRo5ZIW4qT-MPIt6RuHY4yyc5w&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BpoA3dXGt/

    [36] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39019

    [37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31455

    [38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9621; https://t.me/swallow_31ombr/162

    [39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hcH7fUbYWE5yAmpMCwtQVU1j5tKMve1m2ySiQ3YVK7tiFdpTRB9tdVRZyx71HoC2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ukaFwFF1iu2AUoSZekTvvdt6W7axmtjyHfr9cxTZTeSf88Ajk4NksQZwUeDCKbRUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0goRkSXpEEYQTpQC2qobVxf7fSBj318jeP2UFyRGpfhyFHT3dMpLiTZy3Scjp7efCl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14035 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75642

    [40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/19/bez-motoczykliv-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-okupanty-hodyat-v-shturmy-pishky/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=29NXcvb9WF0

    [41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172999

    [42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39049

    [43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hcH7fUbYWE5yAmpMCwtQVU1j5tKMve1m2ySiQ3YVK7tiFdpTRB9tdVRZyx71HoC2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ukaFwFF1iu2AUoSZekTvvdt6W7axmtjyHfr9cxTZTeSf88Ajk4NksQZwUeDCKbRUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0goRkSXpEEYQTpQC2qobVxf7fSBj318jeP2UFyRGpfhyFHT3dMpLiTZy3Scjp7efCl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14035 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75642

    [44] https://t.me/legionoffreedom/1617 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/21396

    [45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hcH7fUbYWE5yAmpMCwtQVU1j5tKMve1m2ySiQ3YVK7tiFdpTRB9tdVRZyx71HoC2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ukaFwFF1iu2AUoSZekTvvdt6W7axmtjyHfr9cxTZTeSf88Ajk4NksQZwUeDCKbRUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0goRkSXpEEYQTpQC2qobVxf7fSBj318jeP2UFyRGpfhyFHT3dMpLiTZy3Scjp7efCl ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/17Cgzd83gP/ ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75642

    [46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31453

    [47] https://t.me/voin_dv/16053 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5847 ; https://t.me/rogozin_do/7337

    [48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hcH7fUbYWE5yAmpMCwtQVU1j5tKMve1m2ySiQ3YVK7tiFdpTRB9tdVRZyx71HoC2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ukaFwFF1iu2AUoSZekTvvdt6W7axmtjyHfr9cxTZTeSf88Ajk4NksQZwUeDCKbRUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0goRkSXpEEYQTpQC2qobVxf7fSBj318jeP2UFyRGpfhyFHT3dMpLiTZy3Scjp7efCl; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/17Cgzd83gP/

    [49] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/18/namagavsya-nepomitno-proslyznuty-na-hersonshhyni-znyshhyly-vorozhyj-choven/; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/15fc43U2kX/

    [50] https://t.me/dva_majors/75634; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31459

    [51] https://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-signs-decree-on-additional-measures-to-provide-army-units-with-transport-drones-169808-2025/ ; https://president.gov dot by/fp/v1/262/document-thumb__67262__original/67262.1752852172.fbf1ecfad9.pdf

    Attachments:

  • Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20July%2019%2C%202025%20PDF.pdf

    • Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 18, 2025

    by: ISW Press





    Jessica Sobieski, Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, and Kateryna Stepanenko

    July 18, 2025, 6:15 pm ET

    Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

    Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

    Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

    Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

    Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on July 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

     

    The European Council of the European Union (EU) approved its 18th sanctions package on July 18, mainly targeting Russian oil revenues and sanctions evasion schemes.[1] The EU announced a landmark oil cap to contain Russian oil prices at 15 percent of the average market price that will automatically adjust semi-annually, and noted that the current price cap is set at $47.60 per barrel – well below the previous $60 per barrel cap.[2] The EU imposed a full transaction ban on any transactions related to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which will prevent the completion, maintenance, and operation of the pipelines. The EU also ended Czechia's exemptions for Russian oil imports. The EU sanctioned an additional 105 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet, increasing the overall number of sanctioned tankers to 444. The EU sanctioned Russian and international companies managing the shadow fleet, an oil refinery in India in which the Russian state oil company Rosneft is a main shareholder, the captain of a shadow fleet vessel, a private operator of an international flag registry, and one entity in the Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector. The EU also imposed an import ban on refined petroleum products made from Russian crude oil and imported from any third country, with the exception of Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Russian government reportedly accounted for some decrease in oil and gas revenue as part of Russia's upcoming national budget, although the EU oil cap and shadow fleet sanctions will likely further degrade Russian oil revenues beyond what the Kremlin previously expected.[3] The EU measures target both Russia’s current ability to sell oil at advantageous pricing and undermines Russia's long-term ability to sell oil to Europe. The EU noted that oil revenues constitute one-third of Russia’s overall revenue, and that recent declines in Russia’s oil revenues in combination with a decrease in market earning potential poses a risk to the Russian federal budget.

    The EU's new sanctions target Russia’s ability to engage with international markets. The EU fully banned EU-based specialized financial messaging services from conducting transactions with 22 Russian banks, in addition to the 23 previously sanctioned Russian banks already subject to the ban.[4] The European Union lowered the threshold for sanctioning third-country financial, credit, and crypto-asset service providers that are connected to the Russian Central Bank’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) or generally supporting Russian sanctions evasion schemes. The EU banned any transaction with the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), its sub-funds and companies, and any companies investing in or owned by the RDIF. The EU also banned the sale, supply, transfer, and export of software management systems and banking and financial sector software to Russia. The EU sanctions target an existing vulnerability within the Russian banking and financial sector, decreasing Russia’s ability to maintain a strong presence in international trade and diversify its economy.

    The EU's new sanctions package also targets actors directly supporting Russian military capabilities. The EU sanctioned three entities based in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and eight companies operating in Belarus that sell goods to the Russian military.[5] The EU also imposed a full transaction ban on Belarusian specialized financial messaging services and embargoed arms imports from Belarus. The EU tightened export restrictions on 26 entities involved in dual-use goods and technologies, including 11 entities in third countries other than Russia. The EU approved over 2.5 billion euros worth of other export bans on items that could support Russia's war effort, including computer numerical control machines and chemicals for propellants. The EU also sanctioned several individuals involved in indoctrinating Ukrainian children, crimes in occupied Ukraine, and spreading Russian propaganda.

    Russian officials continued to falsely claim that sanctions do not have an impact on the Russian economy in response to the EU's new sanctions package. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the EU's new sanctions package is illegal, that Russia has already gained immunity and adapted to life under restrictive measures, and that Russia will analyze the effects of the new package and minimize their effects.[6] Peskov added that each new sanctions package disadvantages those who authorized it. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the EU’s newest sanctions by claiming that the package will not change Russia’s position and that the Russian economy will survive and Russia will continue to fight Ukrainian forces.[7] Medvedev threatened to target Kyiv City and other Ukrainian cities with increasing force in response to the EU’s sanctions package. Medvedev claimed that Russia must learn to “hate” the EU and its “Russophobia” as much as Russia's ancestors did and that “how this ends for Europe is known.” CEO of the RDIF and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries, Kirill Dmitriev, claimed that the EU’s newest sanctions package is hurting Europe more than Russia and limiting European energy supply by closing Russian markets to European companies.[8] Head of the Russian State Duma Committee on Financial Markets Anatoly Aksakov claimed that the new EU sanctions on Russia’s financial system are just a fluctuation in the air, as Russian banks have already been under restrictions from the EU.[9]

    Select Russian officials are acknowledging the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy despite the Kremlin's efforts to disguise and dismiss such impacts. The Moscow Times reported on July 17 that Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev recently told the Russian Federation Council that Russian oil companies are struggling to procure parts to repair refineries due to Western sanctions.[10] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia‘s full-scale war against Ukraine and needs to think of a new growth model.[11] Russia's Minister of Economic Development, Maxim Reshetnikov, stated at SPIEF that Russia is on the "brink of recession."[12] Russia's ongoing sanctions evasion schemes, including via the PRC, are a key aspect of the Kremlin's strategy to offset Western sanctions and relieve pressure on the Russian economy. Russia has created a network of actors to circumvent Western sanctions and is reconfiguring its economic policy and business models to withstand sanctions in the long term, although more extensive Western sanctions will complicate this effort. The EU's newest sanctions are a positive step, but wider Western compliance and enforcement are necessary to inflict maximum economic pressure on Russia.

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council on July 18.[13] Umerov stated that he will oversee the coordination of arms deliveries, joint production efforts, and defense partnerships, as well as advance Ukraine's negotiation track with Russia.[14]

    The Kremlin continues to advance its long-term censorship efforts to assert greater control over the Russian online information space. First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Anton Gorelkin warned on July 18 that the popular WhatsApp messenger should prepare to leave the Russian market, as it is "highly likely" that it will fall under restrictive measures.[15] Gorelkin added that the Kremlin-controlled messaging platform MAX will become a replacement for WhatsApp's users. Russian State Duma Information Policy Committee member Anton Nemkin opined that WhatsApp's presence in Russia's digital space constitutes a breach in national security and proposed that Russia consider Telegram as an alternative, while admitting that MAX is the primary choice for replacing WhatsApp.[16] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that WhatsApp is the most popular messenger in Russia, with roughly 84 million daily users, and that two sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that Russian authorities are almost guaranteed to ban WhatsApp.[17] Another source close to the Presidential Administration told Meduza that Russian authorities are likely to tolerate Telegram as it hosts many Kremlin-affiliated channels and the Kremlin has been able to establish an entire information infrastructure. WhatsApp is owned by Meta, which the Kremlin has designated as an extremist organization.[18] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently ordered the government to impose additional restrictions on the use of software from "unfriendly countries."[19]

    ISW previously noted that the Kremlin planned to designate MAX as its national messenger and that the Kremlin may attempt to ban Telegram and other social media connected to the Western world in the medium- to long-term if the rollout of the new national messenger application is successful.[20] The Kremlin will very likely continue to implement increasingly repressive measures that aim to insulate and censor Russian citizens and promote the Kremlin's war efforts.

    Key Takeaways:

    We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

    Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

    Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 18.

    Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 17 and 18.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and toward Novyi Put (east of Tetkino) from Pavlivka, Sumy Oblast (south of Novyi Put).[22]

    Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno published satellite imagery on July 17 that shows damage at Russia's Energiya chemical and weapons component plant, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely struck the plant during a drone strike in Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast, on July 15.[23]

    Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

    Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

    Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[24]

    Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced farther southwest of Varachyne than July 18 geolocated footage indicated.[25] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[26]

    Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Varachyne on July 17 and 18.[27] Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Andriivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and Yablunivka.[28]

    The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction stated on July 17 that Russian forces are sending sabotage and reconnaissance groups to Ukrainian rear areas to interdict Ukrainian logistics routes.[29] The spokesperson noted that Russian drone operators drop supplies and ammunition to the sabotage and reconnaissance groups once the groups establish positions in the rear, and then the Russian military command deploys “disposable” assault groups to pressure Ukrainian defenses and disrupt their logistics.

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[30]

    Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

    Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[31]

    Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsia, and Zelene on July 17 and 18.[32]

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Kozacha Lopan (northwest of Kharkiv City).[33] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the direction of Vovchansk.[34]

    Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 18 but did not advance.

    A Russian miblogger claimed that Russian forces continue attacking in the Velykyi Burluk direction and Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove.[35]

    Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 18 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on July 17 and 18.[36]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 18 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna and Druzhelyubivka on July 17 and 18.[37]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 18 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove, Korovii Yar, and Serednie; north of Lyman near Kaprivka, Novyi Myr, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 17 and 18.[38]

    Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 18 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on July 17 and 18.[39]

    A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that the intensity of Russian offensive operations in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) has noticeably declined due to Ukrainian forces destroying better-trained Russian forces.[40] The NCO reported that Russian forces are training new units and that the situation remains tense. The NCO reported that Russian forces are using large numbers of motorcycles across the entire frontline but noted that 90 percent of Russian motorcycles are of poor quality and from the People's Republic of China (PRC).

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 18 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Predtechyne, and Stupochky on July 17 and 18.[41]

    A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have developed effective tactics for downing Ukrainian drones in the Chasiv Yar direction, thereby reportedly enabling Russian forces to advance despite Ukrainian drone superiority in the area.[42]

    Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th Airborne Division) reportedly continue to operate in Chasiv Yar.[43]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on July 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk) and Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[44]

    Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Popiv Yar, and Poltavka, and toward Nelipivka, Stepanivka, Katerynivka, and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske on July 17 and 18.[45]

    A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on July 17 that Russian forces are constantly attacking despite sustaining high casualties.[46] The servicemember reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Novospaske and that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are attempting to raise Russian flags on the outskirts of the settlement to falsely claim control of the settlement.

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC] Eastern Military District [EMD]), including its 2nd Separate Artillery Battalion, are reportedly operating near Popiv Yar.[47]

    Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

    Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and likely seized the settlement.[48]

    Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Novotoretske, Myrolyubivka, and Novoekonomichne and toward Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne, and toward Molodetske on July 17 and 18.[49]

    Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions north and northeast of Pokrovsk.[50] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk).[51] Drone operators of the Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[52]

    Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

    Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook Yalta (south of Novopavlivka).[53] Additional geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Komar (south of Novopavlivka).[54] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces recently retook Yalta and Voskresenka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[55] ISW previously noted that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key frontline areas to slow Russian advances.[56]

    Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) advanced in an area one kilometer in depth and two kilometers wide southwest of Piddubne (southwest of Novopavlivka).[57]

    Russian forces continued attacks toward Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Piddubne, Myrne, and Voskresenka and toward Oleksandrohrad on July 17 and 18.[58]

    Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly struck Ukrainian positions near Oleksandrohrad.[59]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 18 but did not advance.

    Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novopil and toward Temyrivka on July 17 and 18.[60]

    Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating toward Maliivka and Sichneve (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[61] Drone operators of the 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA) and the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA) are reportedly also operating near Sichneve.[62]

    Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 18 but did not advance.

    A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces intensified fighting near Marfopil (southwest of Hulyaipole).[63]

    Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

    Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohiria, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and Stepove.[64]

    Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on July 17 and 18.[65]

    Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including drone operators of its 108th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[66]

    Russian forces continued limited attempts to cross the Dnipro River in the Kherson direction on July 18 but did not advance.

    Russian forces attempted to cross the Dnipro River northeast of Kherson City toward Sadove, Prydniprovske, and Kozatsky Island and southwest of Kherson City toward Dniprovske and Hola Prystan on July 18.[67]

    Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

    Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 29 Shahed drones and six decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and targeted Ukrainian frontline positions in eastern Ukraine.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 11 drones and that six decoy drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck locomotives and civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing one person.[69]

    Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

    Russia continues to rely on Belarusian defense companies to produce weapons components for Russia's war effort and to evade sanctions. Ukrainian TV channel Kanal 24 reported on July 17 that Russian defense companies are increasingly using Belarusian-made microcircuits, capacitors, stabilizers, and other components in Russian missiles, including Kh-101 and Kh-69 cruise missiles and Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, and S-300 and S-400 air defense systems.[70] Kanal 24 obtained a letter from the Russian Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Kirill Lusogorsky to the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee Head Dmitry Pantus requesting Belarusian defense companies, namely the Minsk-based Integral and Peleng facilities, supply microelectronics to Russia. Kanal 24 reported that Russia also uses Belarusian microchips in guided glide bombs and unguided missiles.

     

    Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

    [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/

    [2] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eus-new-russia-sanctions-aim-more-effective-oil-price-cap-2025-07-18/; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-18/eu-backs-revised-russia-oil-price-cap-and-new-russia-sanctions

    [3] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-09-23/russia-sees-oil-and-gas-revenue-shrinking-for-next-three-years

    [4] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/

    [5] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/

    [6] https://t.me/tass_agency/325915

    [7] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/598; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/87

    [8] https://t.me/kadmitriev/163

    [9] https://t.me/tass_agency/325956

    [10] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2025/07/17/vrossii-iz-za-sanktsii-nachalis-problemi-sremontom-npz-a169109

    [11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

    [12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

    [13] https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/4962025-55709

    [14] https://x.com/rustem_umerov/status/1946125164158070960 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15175

    [15] https://t.me/webstrangler/4310

    [16] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24548611

    [17] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/07/18/99-chto-eto-sluchitsya-1-ostavim-na-malo-li-chto ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/07/18/voyna

    [18] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24548299 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/16427317

    [19] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24543571

    [20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025

    [21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772

    [22] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31421;

    [23] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/satellite-confirms-strike-on-protected-building-at-russia-s-energia-plant/#google_vignette; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11765?single

    [24] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1945984391978643768; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DMNSSx5iYfU/; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1946005382461014242

    [25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31439

    [26] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

    [27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31439; https://t.me/dva_majors/75601; ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772

    [28] https://t.me/dva_majors/75601; https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

    [29] https://t.me/OSHP_225/5044; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/spochatku-dyversanty-potim-myaso-nova-taktyka-rosiyan-na-sumskomu-napryamku/

    [30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31414

    [31] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

    [32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

    [33] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5845

    [34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96034

    [35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31405 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75601

    [36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

    [37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

    [38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66007

    [39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

    [40] https://www.youtube.com/live/ZVMUSS0B0yo?si=SQi52gl6yTizHiXb ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1069955-na-doneccini-54-brigada-fiksue-spad-nastupalnogo-potencialu-rf/

    [41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24765

    [42] https://t.me/rusich_army/24765

    [43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31414

    [44] https://t.me/rybar/72241 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27900 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325820

    [45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

    [46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/dyversijna-grupa-namagalasya-vstanovyty-prapor-poblyzu-toreczka-shturmy-pochynayutsya-o-tretij-nochi/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo

    [47] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14057

    [48] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1945974942522036545 https://t.me/echo_2_25/612; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1945991088646312173

    [49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75601 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75602 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31429 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

    [50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14058

    [51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172771

    [52] t.me/motopatriot78/39004

    [53] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1946108213516005661 ; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1946113299575099569 https://youtu.be/MyYW6wXLkHk?si=Qr9fjJm0dPq1_RK5 https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1945929547091763686; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9612; https://www.facebook.com/20armycorps/videos/1359756871756913/

    [54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9618; https://t.me/burpobeda/13844

    [55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/18/syly-oborony-ukrayiny-vstanovyly-prapory-u-voskresenczi-ta-yalti/ ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1359756871756913&rdid=q1PZmeBdtVjMSlo4

    [56] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425

    [57] https://t.me/voin_dv/16048

    [58] https://t.me/dva_majors/75601 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl

    [59] https://t.me/voin_dv/16046

    [60] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl

    [61] https://t.me/voin_dv/16048

    [62] https://t.me/voin_dv/16045 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16042

    [63] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

    [64] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

    [65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02m2vteSHE6k2VBHQxBmQwYMm4HvugsTYCaT4ize8Sonn34wMxewHqJeFc6vdtp3Eyl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12756 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl

    [66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31414 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/153139

    [67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl

    [68] https://t.me/kpszsu/38692

    [69] https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7110; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22975; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/18/rosijski-drony-atakuvaly-dnipropetrovshhynu-zagynuv-mashynist-potyaga/;

    [70] https://24tv dot ua/bilorus-prichetna-do-obstriliv-ukrayini-yak-vigotovlyaye-mikroshemi_n2870664 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/investigation-belarusian-defense-industry-aids-russia-in-missile-production/

    Attachments:

  • 2025-07-18-PDF-Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment_0.pdf

    • Iran Update, July 18, 2025

    by: ISW Press





    Avery Borens, Ben Rezaei, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

    Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

    The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

    Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

    Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

     

    Israel reversed its previous demand that Syrian transitional government forces refrain from intervening in Suwayda Province, southern Syria. An unspecified Israeli official reported on July 18 that Israel will “allow” a limited number of Syrian transitional government forces to enter Suwayda for the next 48 hours to restore stability.[1] Syrian transitional government forces withdrew from Suwayda Province on July 17 after Israeli airstrikes conducted "to protect” the Druze inflicted heavy losses on transitional government forces.[2] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on July 16 that Israel would continue to enforce its demand for a demilitarized Syria south of Damascus.[3] Bedouin clans across Syria exploited the security vacuum created in the withdrawal of government forces and deployed to Suwayda to fight Druze militias that are conducting retaliatory killings against Bedouins.[4] These killings by Druze militias are retaliation for the atrocities committed against the Druze in Suwayda by predominantly Sunni militias over the last week. Fighting between factions and attacks on civilians has intensified across Suwayda Province since the government forces withdrew on July 17.

    Syrian transitional government forces are reportedly stationed on the outskirts of Suwayda Province.[5] It is unclear if Syrian government forces have entered Suwayda at this time. Syrian media reported on July 17 that Syrian government forces are present near Soura al Kabira on the Damascus-Suwayda Highway and have reportedly allowed non-government fighters to pass through government checkpoints to enter Suwayda.[6] Syrian media reported on July 18 that Syrian General Security Service (GSS) convoys reached the northern countryside of Suwayda but have not advanced beyond the city of Liwa, northeast of Suwayda Province.[7] An unspecified security source told Reuters on July 18 that Syrian government forces “were awaiting a final green light to enter Suwayda.”[8] Suwaydawi media reported on July 18 that some Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) fighters have removed their uniforms and begun supporting Bedouin fighters.[9] CTP-ISW is unable to verify these claims. The existence of these claims in the information space, combined with atrocities committed by government forces against the Druze over the last week, will have extremely deleterious effects on the government’s ability to present itself as a neutral security guarantor and restore order in Suwayda Province.

    It is very unlikely that the Syrian transitional government will be able to re-secure and establish lasting stability in Suwayda Province within the Israeli-dictated 48-hour window. Government forces initially deployed to Suwayda on June 14 to quell intercommunal violence between Druze and Bedouin communities.[10] Unsanctioned violence and abuses committed by government forces between June 14 and June 16 deepened existing distrust between the government and the Druze.[11] Violence in Suwayda Province has intensified as Sunni Bedouin fighters have flooded Suwayda in the wake of the government forces’ withdrawal. These tribal fighters have seized large swaths of Suwayda’s territory. Government forces returning to Suwayda to quell the violence will need to successfully position themselves so that they can adequately protect both Druze and Sunni Bedouin populations in Suwayda before setting up lasting security mechanisms to suppress violence over the long term. This would likely require a ceasefire among the many armed groups involved in the violence, along with a well-disciplined stay-behind force that could protect both the Druze and Sunni Bedouins equally without resorting to the abuses that government forces have been involved in over the last week. A plan that relies on undisciplined government forces or local, communal-based militias is likely to drive additional violence because these forces would continue to conduct retaliatory killings, contribute to a cycle of violence, and fail to protect the local populations.

    The E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) urged Iran to deliver “concrete results” or the E3 would trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism, but more time is unlikely to result in changes to Iranian policy.[12] The E3 foreign ministers held a teleconference with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi on July 17 to urge Iran to resume nuclear negotiations and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to avoid snapback sanctions.[13] An unspecified French diplomatic source stated the E3 seeks a “verifiable and lasting” deal and reiterated their readiness to reimpose UN sanctions if Iran fails to produce results by the end of August.[14] The E3 would have to initiate the process to impose snapback sanctions by September 3 to complete the 45–65-day process before the measure expires in October 2025.[15] A Wall Street Journal reporter noted that the E3 foreign ministers and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas also suggested extending the snapback deadline during the call.[16] He added that such an extension would reportedly require agreement from Iran and its UN Security Council allies, Russia and China, to amend the timeline.[17] There is no provision in the JCPOA to extend the snapback clause, however.[18] It is unclear how the UN Security Council could amend the snapback timeline, given that the JCPOA is a political agreement among its participants and not a legally binding UN treaty.[19]

    Iran has set a de facto precondition to negotiations that would require the United States to guarantee Iran’s right to enrich before the resumption of any negotiations. Iran has repeatedly reiterated its unwillingness to concede on its right to enrich, though there is an ongoing debate in Iran over resuming negotiations, and this policy could change. Iranian officials have maintained their position on retaining uranium enrichment capabilities despite pressure from the United States and European countries. The delay of snapback sanctions is unlikely to change Iran’s position on nuclear enrichment because a delay does not incentivize Iran to change its position. The Iranian Supreme Leader’s International Affairs Adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, stated on July 14 that Iran would not oppose negotiations without “preconditions” if the United States guarantees Iran’s right to enrichment.[20] The recognition of this right is itself a precondition, however. US officials repeatedly rejected the demand and insisted on “zero enrichment.”[21] Senior Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani separately stated on July 17 that “no talks are underway” and argued that Iran should not rush into negotiations, leaving it to Khamenei to decide when to proceed.[22]

    Senior Iranian commanders are discussing air defense modernization as they assess force readiness after the Israel-Iran War. Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi inspected Iran’s air defense headquarters on July 18 to assess postwar readiness.[23] Mousavi highlighted the need for updated air defense systems, creative tactics, and operational agility to counter “future threats.”[24] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard also presented a report during Mousavi’s visit on recent efforts to strengthen Iran’s air defense capabilities.[25] The emphasis on modernization follows Iran’s ineffective defense against Israeli strikes between June 12 and June 24, using domestically produced systems.[26] Iranian officials may seek to acquire advanced systems from partners like China after domestically produced systems failed.[27]

    Key Takeaways:

    Iran

    See topline section.

    Iraq

    The spokesperson for Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development parliament bloc confirmed on July 18 that Parliament will “proceed” with the Popular Mobilization Authority Law despite objections from unspecified political blocs.[28] The Popular Mobilization Authority Law would integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that operate outside of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the PMF before the PMF integrates into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).[29] Sudani withdrew a previous version of the law from the parliament agenda in March 2025 to prevent political deadlock and to prevent the removal of Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh.[30] A previous version of the law would have required around 3,500 PMF leaders, including Fayyadh, to retire. Shia Coordination Framework-aligned Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi directed the Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee to complete all amendments to the law and submit the final version of the law to Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani for a vote during a parliament session on July 16.[31] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The amended version of the law allows PMF leaders who entered their posts before the law’s passage to maintain their positions.[32] Sudani reportedly withdrew the amended law from the parliamentary agenda on July 17 following US concerns over the legislation.[33]

    Syria

    Bedouin and Druze fighters have continued to fight across Suwayda Province.[34] Bedouin fighters have reportedly advanced into several towns in western Suwayda Province on July 17 and 18, according to Syrian media.[35] There were also engagements between Bedouin and Druze fighters near the western entrance to Suwayda City.[36] The Suwayda Military Council (SMC), a Druze force opposed to the Syrian transitional government, claimed on July 18 that its forces control most of Suwayda Province.[37] The SMC is affiliated with the prominent Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, who has led much of the fighting against the transitional government.[38] The SMC announced that it is conducting operations to clear “extremist terrorist elements” that came to Suwayda from other Syrian provinces.[39] The SMC said that its forces will not “accept any form of surrender” or any concession of Druze rights.[40] The SMC blamed the killings in Suwayda on “extremist terrorist groups” that have entered Suwayda in support of the Syrian transitional government.[41] Footage and images circulated by Syrian media accounts reportedly showed Druze militias affiliated with Hijri also publicly displaying the dead bodies of Bedouin tribesmen throughout Suwayda Province on July 18, which will deepen the animosity between Bedouin and Druze groups and make long-term security in the area more difficult.[42] Neither the Bedouin nor the Druze organizations can be relied upon to properly or adequately provide security in Suwayda because both groups are contributing to continued cycles of violence. Both Bedouin clans and Druze fighters have committed abuses during the ongoing insurgency in Suwayda Province.[43]

    Armed groups from across Syria have reportedly continued to mobilize to deploy to Suwayda Province to engage in the fighting, which will likely exacerbate violence between Druze and Sunni Bedouin armed factions.[44] Syrian media reported on July 18 that at least 30 Bedouin fighters in Deir ez Zor Province began mobilizing to deploy to Suwayda Province.[45] Syrian media also reported on July 18 that unspecified armed convoys from the Syrian desert began deploying to Barek, northeast of Suwayda Province.[46] Bedouin clans across Syria have mobilized and deployed to Suwayda since July 17 to fight Druze militias that are conducting retaliatory killings against Bedouins after the transitional government withdrew from the province.[47] It is unclear at the time of writing how many groups, if any, have successfully deployed to Suwayda. The arrival of armed groups will likely increase intercommunal violence in Suwayda if there continues to be no neutral forces to prevent intercommunal violence.

    The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – the First of the Brave said on July 17 that it will confront sectarian strife with “weapons and reason.”[48] The group is opposed to Israel and uses iconography widely associated with and inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It is relatively weak and limited to no military capability to seriously threaten IDF formations.[49] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria – the First of the Brave previously claimed responsibility for a small-scale rocket attack from southwestern Syria into the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on June 3.[50] The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – the First of the Brave declared a general mobilization of all free fighters to move towards sites in which Israeli forces are present.[51] Israeli forces have been positioned in several Syrian towns in Daraa and Quneitra provinces since December 2024.[52]

    Arabian Peninsula

    Nothing significant to report.

    The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

    Nothing significant to report.

    [1] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israel-says-its-allowing-syrian-forces-to-enter-sweida-for-48-hours-amid-renewed-clashes/

    [2] https://apnews.com/article/syria-druze-israel-clashes-sweida-ceasefire-sharaa-67fdcbd1be73c4890a4ce81bd954d447 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/24244

    [3] https://t.me/moriahdoron/24222

    [4] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1945885395335446926 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1945894267735708079 ; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1945899007240220934 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1945831594272411959 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1945836321236242692

    [5] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/63252

    [6] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid05d46dcpfprXy3dsTnRc3BRprwEf7xznb51KhKxaT6YkiKZRjLhjWDcLvNDr52rTyl ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid036oXWiFF33tbp4BPvq2ADdqRYEBm7WuHAYpE1yorxWvrcTTwb3QQW1qFxuDVs6dNbl

    [7] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/764971/الأمن-السوري-يتجه-إلى-الجنوب-إثر-تعبئة/

    [8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-agrees-allow-syrian-troops-limited-access-sweida-2025-07-18/

    [9] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1946166836032065614

    [10] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1944710037772910613 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/14/world/middleeast/syria-clashes-deaths-bedouin-druse.html

    [11] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1945170313303744593 ; https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1945084786285879705 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1945054541587578965 ; https://www.facebook.com/alraased/posts/1148135394002180?__cft__[0]=AZX3LUmraaCgSnV8CJo1rFEqsb0v_hIMQBL0sNGSvmY2Gn0vMoiSpI0aQr8bIdw_ZdojX1Aq4ihL3TORAUUskTkU5Fr7VF9rX77_wZDZzzbHj0wqrl5V-eNBkCj9ZpLJIJFUulvlkl9d80ZE6-UFU2YNdAuYlyoHr-wglKZmAhB7bQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

    [12] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europeans-warn-iran-un-sanctions-if-no-concrete-progress-nuclear-issue-2025-07-17/

    [13] https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1946202162310021132 ; https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1946201966830301582

    [14] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europeans-warn-iran-un-sanctions-if-no-concrete-progress-nuclear-issue-2025-07-17/

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    [16] https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1946202511976677591

    [17] https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1946202511976677591

    [18] file:///C:/Users/Ben%20Rezaei/Desktop/245317.pdf

    [19] https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/fdd-backgrounder-faq-the-snapback-of-un-sanctions-on-iran.pdf

    [20] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6529656

    [21] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1941430780518924595 ;

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    [23] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6534037

    [24] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6534037

    [25] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6534037

    [26] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/15/world/middleeast/irans-air-defenses-were-diminished-in-rounds-of-conflict-giving-israel-greater-aerial-freedom.html ;

    https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/1411633/ ;

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    http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/qwfb/16393377.html ;

    https://armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2025/intelligence-iran-seeks-to-acquire-chinese-j-10c-fighter-jets-to-counter-israeli-f-35i-superiority ;

    https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/750222 ;

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    [29] https://almadapaper dot net/400352/

    [30] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86 ; https://almadapaper dot net/398498/    ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-12-2025

    [31] https://en.964media dot com/38210/

    [32] https://baghdadtoday dot news/278745-.html

    [33] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=230032

    [34] https://x.com/MiddleEast_24/status/1946241699241402597 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1946166836032065614

    [35] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1945897690220368261 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/63241 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/63242 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/63245 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/63291

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    [42] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/147787 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/147796 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/147792

    [43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025 ;  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025

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    [45] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1946188105192480957

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    [47] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1945885395335446926 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1945894267735708079 ; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1945899007240220934 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1945831594272411959 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1945836321236242692

    [48] https://t.me/almkaomasy/415

    [49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-25-2025 ; https://israel-alma dot org/the-islamic-resistance-front-in-syria-is-this-a-new-potential-threat-to-israel/

    [50] https://t.me/almkaomasy/345 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025

    [51] https://t.me/almkaomasy/415

    [52] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/02/israel-syria-golan-ceasefire-line/ ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-expands-military-presence-in-southern-syria-with-10-bases-residents-displaced/3624194#:~:text=DAMASCUS/ISTANBUL,breach%20of%20the%20disengagement%20accord.

    Attachments:

  • 2025-07-18-PDF-Iran%20Update.pdf